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POLITICAL ACTIVITY LIMITS AND TAX
EXEMPTION: A GORDIAN’S KNOT
Roger Colinvaux

∗

The article considers the correct tax treatment of organized political
activity by the tax system and discusses the problems that have arisen from
political activity depending on whether the organization is a charity, a
noncharitable exempt, or a political organization. The article then examines
administrative and legislative options to the problems raised by political
activity. Quantum-based solutions to the problem of political activity by
noncharitable exempts do not provide a clear advantage over present law.
Formally quantifying the “primarily” test would result in more certainty,
but would also require that the Service be more, not less, involved in the
regulation of political activity. If the policy goal is to curb political activity
by noncharitable exempts, changing the test from “primarily” to something
more restrictive like “substantially” or “exclusively” would be effective, but
would create new categories of taxable nonprofits that are treated worse
than political organizations for engaging in less political activity, which is
irrational. Further, it is not clear, especially after the Citizens United
decision, why as a matter of tax exemption the regulations decree that
political activity may not further noncharitable exempt purposes. Before
Citizens United, the political activity limits were not especially relevant, but
at least helped to differentiate organization types. However, Citizens United
largely rendered existing tax law limitations obsolete by making a new kind
of multi-purpose organization possible. As a result, definitional political
activity limits are no longer justified and should be eliminated, but only if
the 527(f) tax on investment income remains vital and the differences in the
disclosure regimes between political organizations and noncharitable
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exempts are erased. In addition, Congress should affirm that the gift tax
does not apply with respect to political contributions, but also extend the
income tax to transfers of appreciated property to noncharitable exempts.
Further, Congress should acknowledge that the increase in political speech
by noncharitable exempts will lead to abuse of charitable organizations, and
take steps to prevent the laundering of independent expenditures through
the charitable form. Congress also should recognize that Citizens United has
led to a need to develop a new tax baseline for political activity conducted
“for profit” or outside of section 527.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Human beings are political animals. In a democracy like the United
States, this means that the impulse to intervene in a political campaign by
advocating expressly for or against a candidate is innate. Our freedom to
indulge this impulse is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S.
1
Constitution, as “the most fundamental [of] First Amendment activities.”
Taxation is also fundamental to a free society. Payment of taxes is a
2
charge on citizenship — “what we pay for [a] civilized society.” Taxes
allow for the common defense and general welfare and fund a government
that provides the basis for electoral activity.
But apart from the obvious fact that tax policy is a major political issue,
the puzzle is what these two features of civil life — political activity and
the payment of taxes — have to do with one another. For those not versed
in the federal income tax law, the answer might be appealingly obvious:
nothing. Political activity is about speech, and taxation is about raising
revenue. They do not seem directly connected.
Merely a cursory glance at recent news, however, shows that taxation
and political activity have an ominous link. In May 2013, the Internal

1

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S.
87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2
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Revenue Service (Service) was accused of political bias in determining the
3
tax-exempt status of applicants. If true, this would have been a scandal of
similar proportion to when President Nixon ordered the Service to
4
investigate his political enemies. It would also have been an abuse of
power, and perhaps worthy of the indignant exclamations and hostile finger
pointing prevalent in the hearing rooms of Congress over the summer of
5
2013.
But if false — if rather than political targeting, the Service had been
attempting, clumsily, to administer the tax law — then the accusations
highlight important questions about the relevance of political activity to the
tax system. Why would the taxing authority ask questions about an
organization’s prospective political activity if not for nefarious reasons?
Why else would the Service willingly wander into a thicket of controversy,
especially when little revenue is likely at stake? To those familiar with tax
law, the answer is easy. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) dictates that
political activity is relevant to an organization’s tax status. Accordingly, the
Service should, indeed must, ask about political activity — the topic is a
legitimate target of inquiry.
Thus, political activity plainly matters for tax purposes. What is less
clear, however, is why it matters. The relationship between political activity
and taxation is neither obvious nor widely understood. Why does the tax
classification of an organization depend on whether the organization
engages in political activity, and if it does, on the amount of activity?
Should the fact of political activity convert a tax-exempt entity into a
taxable one? Should too much political activity result in reclassification of a
tax-exempt entity from one type to another type? What is at stake that
forces the Service to become involved in such questions, and as a result,
jeopardizes the integrity, not to mention the funding and mission, of a vital
administrative agency?
3

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA
WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013).
4
David Dykes, Former IRS Chief Recalls Defying Nixon, USA TODAY (May 26,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/26/irs-chief-defied-nixon/2360
951/ (describing former Internal Revenue Service (Service) Commissioner Johnnie Mac
Walters’ efforts to prevent Service involvement in Nixon’s investigation requests and noting
comparisons between contemporary accusations of Service bias).
5
The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (2013). As of this writing, the
controversy continues. Hearing with IRS Commissioner John Koskinen: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. (2014), opening statement of Chairman Camp
(stating that “[t]he time for denials, delays, obstruction and attempts to blow this off as a
“phony scandal” are over. This Committee is fed up and we expect some answers, from not
only the IRS, but the whole Administration.”).
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The answers to these questions — always of interest — have become
urgent after the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal
6
Election Commission. Citizens United allowed corporations and labor
unions to engage in unlimited independent political activity — in effect
establishing a major new legal category of speech. This represents a
fundamental change to the legal landscape, the effects of which are still
being felt.
One of the main immediate results is that the funding and conduct of
political activity has expanded to new organization types. Before Citizens
United, the bulk of political activity was conducted by the “political
organization,” a type of tax-exempt entity whose donors must be publicly
7
disclosed. After Citizens United it is natural to expect that political activity
will be conducted much more by “social welfare” and other noncharitable
exempt organizations like labor unions and trade associations, groups that
8
are not required to disclose their donors. Political activity also might
9
migrate to the for-profit or taxable nonprofit form.
Even apart from such effects, the full legal significance of Citizens
United’s expansion of speech has yet to be understood. This article argues
that a main effect of Citizens United is to render the existing tax-exemption
architecture outmoded, if not obsolete. The Service’s targeting scandal was
but a mere symptom of this obsolescence. Accordingly, as part of tax
reform, lawmakers should undertake a comprehensive review of political
activity within the tax-exemption system. This article provides a guide for
such a review and an analysis of various administrative and legislative
solutions.
Part II considers the relationship between political activity and the tax
system from a theoretical and practical perspective. This includes a
discussion of the normative and historical baseline for taxing political

6

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
I.R.C. § 527(j); Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and
Justification for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181,
1181 (2007) (noting how 527 groups were the center of most concerns about campaign
finance following the 2004 election).
8
Thomas B. Edsall, Dark Money Politics, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (June 12,
2013, 9:39 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/dark-money-politics/
?_r=0. Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363, 363 (2011) (stating that: “[t]he
role of noncharitable exempt organizations . . . was perhaps the key feature of [the 2010]
election”).
9
Randy Krehbiel, T.W. Shannon Supporters Set Up For-Profit Corporation to Pay for
Ads, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 24, 2014).
7

6
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activity by individuals, both acting alone and through the pooling of efforts,
and the relevance of the nonprofit form to the conduct of political activity.
Part III briefly outlines the problems that political activity presents for
the income tax system. One problem is definitional. The absence of a clear
or uniform definition of political activity makes it hard to regulate. More
importantly though, political activity must be assessed contextually.
Political activity raises rather different challenges depending on whether the
organization is a charity, a social welfare or other noncharitable exempt
organization, or a political organization. The article discusses the nature of
the problem in each case.
Part IV considers possible administrative solutions to problems raised
by political activity, largely with respect to noncharitable exempt
organizations. Broadly speaking, these include solutions based on how to
define political activity, or whether to clarify or change the levels of
permitted political activity. Rejecting many of the more conventional
solutions, the article argues that, in the wake of Citizens United, the rule
that political activity by definition is not consistent with noncharitable
exempt purposes no longer makes sense from a tax perspective and, in
theory, should be eliminated. In other words, political activity by
noncharitable exempts should be allowed as consistent with exempt
purposes. In practice, however, Part IV explains, elimination of current
political activity limits by the Service would likely eviscerate donor
disclosure rules; therefore, the only real solution to the principal problem
lies with congressional action. Nevertheless, Part IV outlines some other
modest steps the Treasury Department could take to improve administration
of the rules.
Part V turns to legislative solutions. Arguing that the principal problem
of present law is the different disclosure rules that apply across tax
exemption categories, the first and best solution is for a uniform set of
donor disclosure rules. From a tax perspective, Congress should simply
remove the campaign finance-based disclosure rules from the tax code and
leave the administration of disclosure to the Federal Election Commission.
If political activity disclosure rules must remain in the tax code, Congress
should at least provide for uniformity (whether it be for more or less or no
disclosure). Otherwise, groups will continue to have incentives to exploit
legal ambiguity and force the Service to deepen its involvement in
regulating political activity.
Next, Part V argues that Congress should recognize that the
definitional political activity limits for noncharitable exempts cannot be
justified from a tax perspective after Citizens United. Congress should
eliminate the rule that political activity categorically does not further
exempt purposes, or, if the rule is retained, equalize the tax treatment
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between noncharitable exempts and political organizations. This could be
done by expanding the tax-exemption for political organizations to include
noncharitable exempt function income. Relatedly, Congress should apply
the income tax to donors of property on the appreciation when property is
transferred to noncharitable exempt organizations. In addition, because it is
increasingly less plausible after Citizens United to force political activity to
be conducted from existing forms, it is time for Congress to develop a new
baseline for treatment of a political organization outside of section 527.
Finally, Part V explains that Citizens United increases the likelihood
that charitable organizations will be used as conduits for political activity.
This could result in donors taking charitable deductions for funds that are
transferred to related noncharitable exempt entities. To protect the integrity
of charitable organizations, and prevent against illicit charitable deductions
for political activity, Congress should take steps to prevent abuse.
Legislation could include either a “proxy tax” regime on charitable
organizations making grants to politically active organizations, or an excise
tax on grants to such organizations if the funds are not used for the intended
charitable purposes.
Political activity is fundamental to a free society, but it is not immune
from the tax system. When political activity becomes a tax issue, the
Service often finds itself at the center of controversy. Service action aside,
however, responsibility for the underlying policy regarding the regulation
of political activity is and should be with Congress. Citizens United is a
major shock to the tax-exemption system, and deserves a considered
response. In crafting solutions, Congress (and the Service) should be
mindful that, as recent events have shown, it is not in the public interest to
involve the Service any more than necessary in the regulation of political
activity. Some Service involvement is important, and required, to enforce
tax policy goals. Where tax policy is not at stake, though, appropriate
solutions should focus on minimizing the Service’s role, a goal this article
regards as fundamental.
II. THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY TAX BASELINE
This part describes why political activity is relevant to the income tax
system. The issues are how the system should treat political activity by
individuals, acting both alone and through collective efforts, and the
relevance of the nonprofit form to the conduct of political activity. Use of
the term “should” here invokes a normative question of the “correct” tax
treatment, or, the way for the tax system to treat political activity without
providing a subsidy. The discussion is critical to establishing a normative

8
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baseline for the tax treatment of political activity, which in turn helps to
delineate the appropriate regulatory role for the Service.
A. Political Activity by Individuals Acting Alone and Together
Consider first political activity by an individual: Fred. Fred buys card
stock and paint and paints a handful of yard signs that say “Vote Smith for
President.” Fred also makes a contribution to Smith’s campaign. A
necessary tax question arises: should Fred be able to claim a tax deduction
for the cost of the card stock, paint, and the amount of the contribution? No,
clearly not. This is personal consumption by Fred. Under the prevailing
norms of the income tax no deduction or credit should be allowed. Fred’s
political activity should be funded with after-tax dollars as with other forms
of consumption. Spending on political campaigns, though clearly political
expression, is like buying theater tickets: it is a personal choice of how to
consume funds and should be made with after-tax income.
What if Fred were allowed a deduction or credit for his political
activity? A deduction or credit would take the political activity expense out
of the tax base, meaning that individuals would enjoy the benefit of income
tax exemption to the extent income is used for political activity. The result
10
would be a subsidy for the activity, as defined against the norm that
includes personal consumption as within the income tax base.
Now, assume that Alice, also a supporter of Smith for President, sees
Fred’s signs and suggests that Alice and Fred combine efforts in support of
Smith. To make accounting more efficient, Alice and Fred open a joint
bank account, incorporate the account, and finance their political activity
from the contributions each makes to the account. Should the formation of
11
the bank account result in a tax on the contributions? No, Alice and Fred
have both already paid tax with respect to the amounts deposited in the
account and used to fund political activity. The bank account is just a
device Alice and Fred use to pool their individual efforts.
Does it follow, however, that if the bank account is not taxed on the
contributions of Alice and Fred, the nontaxation is a tax benefit? No. Here,
nontaxation, in the form of a tax exemption to the bank account, functions
10

A subsidy in the form of a deduction would be unlimited and would raise serious
distributional concerns. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527
Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776-78 (explaining that “[i]f electioneering
could be funded with pre-tax dollars, it would raise serious concerns,” namely “the
disproportionate and unlimited government subsidization of campaigns”). A subsidy in the
form of a credit, capped as to amount, would be less problematic.
11
Alice and Fred might also establish a partnership. Either form would be a “political
organization.” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
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not as a tax benefit or subsidy but as a measuring device. In other words,
the “exemption” label in this context does not indicate special tax treatment
but performs the critical function within an income tax of ensuring that
income is taxed once — when earned by Alice and Fred, and not when
pooled together for their joint personal consumption.
Similarly, when the bank account spends the money for political
activity, no deduction should be available. If the bank account is treated as a
surrogate for Alice and Fred, then a no-deduction rule makes sense because
neither Alice nor Fred would have been allowed a deduction when spending
sums for political activity from their own accounts. Pooling their spending
12
should not and does not change the tax treatment.
What if Alice and Fred, after making contributions to the bank account,
become disillusioned with Smith and cease their political activity? The
money remains in the bank account and bears interest. Should the interest
be subject to income tax? Yes. Just as if Fred alone saves money instead of
spending it, the savings increment is income and subject to tax. The result
should be no different when Fred and Alice jointly generate investment
income.
This simple model establishes the baseline income tax treatment for
political activity (political activity baseline) — no subsidy. Political activity
by an individual is a form of consumption, paid with after-tax dollars. As an
initial matter, this essential treatment should not change when the political
activity takes on an organizational form.
Current law is broadly in accord with the political activity baseline. For
individuals acting alone, political activity is funded with after-tax dollars.
13
No deductions or credits are allowed for political expenditures. Although
Congress in the past has allowed a deduction for political contributions, the
14
subsidy was abandoned. For individuals pooling their political activities,
the Code likewise traces the political activity baseline. Broadly, under
15
16
section 527, which applies to “political organizations,” the income of a
political organization used for political purposes is not taxed (so called
12

As Professor Dan Halperin has said, “the goal should be to impose the same tax
burden on group activities that would apply if similar activities were conducted
individually.” Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133,
134–35 (2006) (noting that the exemption for political parties “may reflect the notion
that . . . pooling resources does not in itself result in income”).
13
This appropriate normative treatment is reflected in the rule denying a deduction for
personal expenses. I.R.C. § 262.
14
See The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 560–62.
15
Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
(“Code”) of 1986.
16
I.R.C. § 527(a).
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“exempt function income”). Investment (and other) income is subject to
18
tax. Alice and Fred’s joint bank account would fall under the Code’s
treatment of a political organization.
B. Challenges to the Political Activity Baseline
Broadly speaking, there is considerable support for the political activity
baseline in history and commentary. Initially the Service declined to apply
19
the income tax to contribution income of political organizations. Although
the reasoning is not clear, the Service ultimately relied upon the theory that
20
political organizations were like conduits (a pooling of income theory).
Later, Congress also embraced an exemption for contribution income but
appeared to believe that the basis for the Service’s position was that
21
political contributions were gifts. Regardless of the precise rationale,
Congress asserted unequivocally at the time that “political activity
(including the financing of political activity) as such is not a trade or
22
business which is appropriately subject to tax,”
suggesting that
contribution income of political organizations is outside the tax base and
23
that exemption is not a subsidy. In addition, commentators affirm that the

17

I.R.C. § 527(c)(1)(A). More precisely, the Code defines exempt function income to
include contributions of money or other property, membership dues, political fundraising
proceeds, and certain bingo game proceeds. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3).
18
Id.
19
As the IRS acknowledged, the rationale for excluding the income was not clear. Gen
Couns. Mem. 35, 664 (noting that “the precise justification for excluding political campaign
expense contributions from gross income has never been clearly articulated. It is clear
however, that the justification for excluding political campaign expense contributions from
income is not that the contributions are gifts . . . .”). For a discussion of the history of the tax
treatment of political organizations, see William P. Streng, The Federal Tax Treatment of
Political Contributions and Political Organizations, 29 TAX LAW. 139 (1976); see also infra
discussion accompanying notes 63 to 71. For additional discussion, see Roger Colinvaux,
Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red Herring of Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT’L
TAX J. 531, 535-36 (2006).
20
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (Mar. 20, 1990) (noting that Congress had
“essentially codified the conduit concept”).
21
S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7508 (1974). As the author has noted previously, the Service
historically described political contributions alternatively as excluded either from gross
income or from taxable income. Exclusion from gross income suggests a pooling of income
theory; exclusion from taxable income suggests a gift theory. See Colinvaux supra note 19,
at n. 12.
22
S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7502 (1974).
23
As noted infra notes 191 and 222, Congress in 2000 appears to have viewed section
527 as providing a subsidy and so used the subsidy as the hook to impose disclosure
conditions, but this view of section 527 is mistaken.

2014]

Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption

11

nontaxation of contributions made to fund political activity reflects
24
application of “general tax principles.”
Notwithstanding the authority, perhaps the most compelling point in
support of the exemption provided by the political activity baseline is a
simple one. The political contribution income of organizations categorically
has never been subject to income tax. The explanations for this result have
25
differed and thus there is confusion about the rationale. Sometimes,
though, the best evidence is fact: for over 100 years, an organization’s
income, broadly defined, simply has not included political contribution
income.
Nevertheless, the political activity baseline as the non-subsidy norm is
subject to challenge. A principal challenge arises from the term
“exemption,” which carries with it an implicit idea of a government tax
subsidy. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the Supreme Court
asserted that “tax exemptions . . . are a form of subsidy that is administered
26
through the tax system.” The simple conclusion is that if the Code
provides for an exemption, then there is a subsidy. The resulting challenge
to the political activity baseline is that taxation of political contribution
income should be the norm, and exemption is the deviation from the norm,
and a subsidy. This matters because if exemption provides a subsidy, then
the government has a stronger interest in regulating the activity.
The idea that exemption equals subsidy, though sometimes accurate, is
incomplete. There are examples in the Code, apart from political
27
organizations, where exemption is not a form of subsidy. Social clubs and
28
homeowners associations are two illustrations. In other words, the mere
24

Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1013 (2005); Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt
Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 106th Cong. 60 (2000) (statement of Joseph Mikrut, Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S.
Department of Treasury); Halperin, supra note 12, at 134; Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 532540; see also Boris L. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Tax, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 306 (1976).
25
For example, Congress has relied on a gift theory of exemption. S. REP. NO. 931357, at 7508 (1974). The Service has relied on a conduit theory. I.R.S Gen. Couns. Memo.
35,664 (Feb. 8, 1974) (noting that “the precise justification for excluding political campaign
expense contributions from gross income has never been clearly articulated.”) For additional
discussion, see Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 535-36.
26
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
27
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (the exemption for social clubs); I.R.C. § 528 (and
homeowners associations).
28
See e.g., the exemption for social clubs, I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) and homeowners
associations, I.R.C. § 528. For discussion of the nature of exemption for many nonprofit
organizations, see Halperin, supra note 12.
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use of an “exemption” label in the Code does not answer the subsidy
question.
The Supreme Court indirectly acknowledged as much by elaborating in
Taxation With Representation that the “subsidy” provided by exemption
generally is like “a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it
29
would have to pay on its income.” This formulation works assuming that
exemption is a subsidy, because then the exemption functions to protect
30
otherwise taxable income. But when exemption is not a subsidy, but
instead is just a statement of the correct tax treatment, then there is not a
31
normative alternative, i.e., no “amount of tax to pay on its income.”
Whether exemption is or is not a subsidy applies across many exemption
32
categories.
Nevertheless, the exemption-as-subsidy reflex ushered in by Taxation
With Representation has crept into judicial assessments of exempt status of
political organizations. Without analysis of whether the exemption provided
for political organizations is a subsidy, the 11th Circuit upheld disclosure
rules imposed on political organizations as a constitutional condition of a
33
subsidy provided by Congress. Some commentators reasonably conclude
from this that what might matter most to a determination of subsidy by
courts is the fact of a statutory exemption rather than resort to principles of
34
taxation. In other words, a “subsidy” for purposes of constitutional law
may be different than a subsidy viewed through the lens of a normative
29

Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544.
In the context of Taxation With Representation and section 501(c)(3) organizations,
exemption does provide a subsidy. See Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for
Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011).
31
One rejoinder to the “exemption is not a subsidy” argument is to posit taxation in the
absence of the statutory-based exemption of section 527, i.e., to ask whether absent a
statutory exemption income would be recognized and tax otherwise would be paid. As
discussed, supra and infra, the statutory-based exemption merely codified the existing
administrative-based exemption. Although typically, exclusions (or exemptions) from
taxation are derived from a clear statutory provision, significant exclusions from “income”
without a statutory directive also are fundamental to the system. For example, imputed
income and child support payments are excluded from gross income despite the absence of a
specific exclusion or exemption. The exemption for political activity income is another
example.
32
The gatekeeper of the tax subsidy label (i.e., “tax expenditures”) is the
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, which does not consider tax exemption as a
subsidy except in limited cases. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2013-2018, at 39 (Comm. Print 2014).
The author was formerly a Legislation Counsel with the Joint Committee.
33
Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d.1357, 1359 (11th Cir.
2003).
34
Aprill, supra note 8, at 363, 400.
30

2014]

Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption

13

income tax. Even so, the Court’s formulation of what constitutes a tax
subsidy in Taxation With Representation and the fact that there is no
evidence that Congress viewed the exemption for political contribution
income as a subsidy when enacting section 527, point toward affirmation of
the political activity baseline as the appropriate tax treatment.
Apart from the exemption label, the political activity baseline also
faces more direct attacks. It is one thing to accept a pooling of income
rationale for local or neighborly activity, and another when pooling occurs
on a large scale as happens with today’s political organizations. As
Professor Donald Tobin has argued, well-funded independent political
organizations now bear little resemblance to the types of organizations that
the Service (and indirectly Congress) likely had in mind when embracing a
35
pooling or conduit theory of exemption. Furthermore, there are inherent
limitations to the pooling theory. It seems to apply most aptly in cases
where the organization merely is doing the bidding of its contributors, and
not when organization managers have substantial control and discretion
over the expenditure of funds, as do those of independent political
36
organizations.
These points, though well taken, do not undermine the case that
exemption for political contribution income of organizations does not
provide a subsidy. It is true that political activity funded by a million Alices
or Freds might result in targeted political advertising, campaign rallies, and
37
other campaign efforts far more potent than Alice and Fred’s yard sign.
Nevertheless, the quality or scale of the political activity, standing alone, is
not a sufficient variable to alter the political activity baseline. The essential
principle remains the same. The income has already been taxed. It does not
matter whether the pooled income magnifies the impact of the spending. No
new wealth has been created just because the quality of the spending
38
changes through a pooling of efforts under independent control.
35

Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next
“Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41, 76–78 (2007).
36
Id.
37
Whether the political activity of an organization differs meaningfully from political
activity conducted by individuals likely depends on the wealth of the contributors and the
size of the contributions. Some wealthy individuals may establish, fund, and control a
political organization that serves mainly to facilitate the activity of the individual, albeit with
an organizational name. In such a case, the tax question is qualitatively no different than if
Fred acting alone and with small sums decided to conduct activity using an organization
instead of individually.
38
Assume for example that instead of political activity, Alice and Fred and ten others
pool efforts to buy a mansion with a swimming pool, well-equipped theater, and other
luxuries. The dozen contributors become joint owners of the mansion. Does the fact that the
pooling of resources results in a purchase of a markedly different quality than was possible
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Another challenge to the political activity baseline for organizations
39
would arise if a political organization were to have a profit motive. A
blanket exemption for political contribution income and denial of
40
deductions for political activity expenses make sense under a pooling of
income theory, but not for a for-profit activity, which requires a more
nuanced view both of contributions and expenses.
On the one hand, a political contribution to a for-profit political
organization could be a contribution to the capital of the organization,
analogous to the payments Alice and Fred made to establish a joint bank
account. Capital contributions are intended to provide a foundation for the
41
creation of wealth and should not be subject to tax. Thus, with respect to
capital contributions, the (political) contribution income should not be taxed
to the corporation.
On the other hand, political contributions also might be a purchase of
services and not a capital contribution, in which case tax exemption at the
corporate level for the contributions would not be appropriate. The forprofit political organization is not a mere pooling of resources, but the
coming together by persons to conduct a productive activity and generate
wealth. This is the reason for the corporate income tax, and thus income in
effect to purchase the corporate activity should not be exempt at the
organizational level.
In addition, with respect to the expenses of a for-profit political
organization, the organization should be taxed based on its net income. The
broad goal of an income tax is to measure and tax accessions to wealth.
Deductions are the principal measuring tool used to distinguish net from
gross income, and arrive at the proper taxable amount. Accordingly, the for42
profit political organization should be allowed to deduct expenses
without pooling necessarily have an income tax consequence? In other words, should the act
of pooling itself be taxed? In general, the answer is no. The joint-owners got what they paid
for, nothing more, nothing less — there is no income to them. And the association, if any,
formed to purchase the mansion likewise does not have income. Compare I.R.C. § 528.
39
At present, in general, political activity is not conducted in the “for-profit” form. See
Tobin, supra note 5, at 48 (noting that “almost all [independent political organizations]
operate as tax-exempt organizations”). However, after Citizens United, the for-profit, or
alternatively, the nonprofit taxable form, is of increasing likelihood. See Donald B. Tobin,
The 2013 IRS Crisis: Where Do We Go from Here?, 142 TAX NOTES 1120 (2014). For a
more detailed discussion of a taxable political organization (i.e., one organized outside of
section 527), see Tobin, supra note 35.
40
Under section 527, no deduction is allowed for political activity expenses but
deductions in production of other income are allowed.
41
See I.R.C. § 118(a). For an assessment of the capital contribution theory of
exemption for contribution income, see Tobin, supra note 35, at 81-84.
42
As a practical matter, the disallowance of a deduction for political activity expenses
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incurred to earn fees, including political activity-related expenses. To the
extent payments exceed expenses, the organization would have a profit and
would pay tax on the profit. In short, the political activity baseline does not
provide the right treatment for a for-profit political organization with
respect to either contributions or expenses.
The two main challenges to the political activity baseline then are the
belief that section 527 is not the correct normative treatment but rather
provides a subsidy, and the prospect of the for-profit political organization.
The implication of both challenges is that there is, or should be, an
alternative tax treatment to that provided by section 527 (or the political
activity baseline). In other words, if section 527 provides a subsidy, there
should be a reasonable nonsubsidy tax alternative. If a political entity is forprofit, then the profit motive should be taken into account by the Code.
Section 527, however, purports to apply the exclusive tax treatment for
43
political organizations, irrespective of subsidy treatment or profit motive.
Under a mandatory view of section 527, there is no alternative tax
treatment. Further, even if section 527 is elective, the tax treatment of a
political organization outside of section 527 is uncertain. Without a clear
statutory exemption for contribution income, the income to finance political
44
activity arguably would be subject to tax. Yet political activity expenses
45
generally are not allowed a deduction. It is possible that a for-profit
is of no moment for a political for-profit because the disallowance is offset by the blanket
exemption for contribution income. Indeed, section 527 does provide a subsidy to a political
for-profit to the extent that political fee for service income exceeds expenses. For tax
purposes, a political for-profit would have little reason to reject tax treatment as a political
organization under section 527.
43
In general, not-for-profit status is a matter of state law and is not a condition of tax
exemption in the Code’s various exemption provisions. But many exemption categories
contain a proscription on private inurement (often called the nondistribution constraint). The
ban on private inurement is a bar on the distribution of corporate earnings, which has the
effect of disqualifying for-profit corporations from exempt status.
44
As the author has argued elsewhere, given that political activity income has never
categorically been included in income, it may be difficult to assert inclusion absent an
express provision in the Code. See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 544. Some argue that
political contributions might be excluded as gifts. Tobin, supra note 35. Others cast doubt on
whether there is sufficient “detached and disinterested generosity” for political contributions
to qualify as gifts. See Aprill, supra note 8, at 544.
45
I.R.C. § 162(e). There is an exception to the general rule of disallowance of a
deduction for political activity expenses. Taxpayers in the trade or business of political
activity are allowed to deduct political activity expenses made “directly on behalf of another
person.” I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(A). The scope of this exception is uncertain, though the
legislative history to the provision indicates that it was not intended to apply to “taxable
membership organizations which act to further the interests of all their members rather than
the interests of any one particular member.” H.R. Rep. 103-213, pt. 4, at 610 (1993).
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political organization, or a political organization that rejects a “subsidy” and
opts for taxation outside the section 527 regime, could be subject to tax on
46
its gross income.
To conclude, the current law exemption for political organizations is
not a subsidy but the representation of the principle that activity should be
taxed once and that the tax system should endeavor to treat an activity the
same whether carried out alone or through joint efforts. Nevertheless, the
political activity baseline, largely codified in section 527, is subject to
challenge. The thrust of challenges to the baseline is that alternatives to
section 527 treatment are necessary.
III. SOURCES OF PROBLEMS RAISED BY POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE TAX
SYSTEM
This part provides an overview of the reasons political activity raises
problems for the tax system. Broadly speaking, problems arise from two
sources. One stems from the definition of political activity, and the other
stems from legal architecture. This article focuses more on issues of legal
architecture than on issues of definition, though the two are related.
A. Problems Arising from Defining Political Activity
Political activity is the subject of regulation, so knowing what is, and
what is not, political activity is important. In general, political activity may
loosely be characterized as activity intended to directly affect the election of
47
a candidate for public office. A positive definition of political activity has
been elusive, however. Express advocacy on behalf of, or in opposition to, a
48
candidate is clearly political activity, as are contributions to a candidate’s
49
campaign or to a political party and the rating of candidates. Nonpartisan
educational efforts such as get-out-the-vote campaigns and voter guides
historically have not been considered political activity, even though they

46

As discussed infra Part V(B)(5), this result arguably exists within section 527 with
respect to political organizations that fail to notify the Service of their existence.
47
Political activity is distinct from lobbying, which generally refers to attempts to
sway the votes of elected representatives with respect to legislation. Political activity and
lobbying each raises its own set of issues and rules and the two should be kept separate.
48
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding
revocation of a church’s 501(c)(3) status for advertisements urging Christians not to vote for
candidates Bill Clinton and Al Gore in the 1992 presidential election).
49
Association of the Bar of New York v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir.
1988) (denying 501(c)(3) status to bar association because the rating of judges was political
activity); Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194.
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50

affect campaign outcomes. The hosting of forums for candidate debate
51
also is not political activity, so long as the event is open to all candidates.
Other activities are less definitive and ultimately depend on the facts and
circumstances such as the timing, regularity, extent, and nature of the
52
activity.
Issue advocacy is a type of activity that nicely illustrates the problems
of defining political activity. Without question, taking a stand on issues,
53
without more, is not a political activity. If an environmental protection
organization educates the public about the dangers of climate change in a
well funded and prominent series of advertisements, the activity should
merely be one of expressing a view on issues, and not political. If, however,
the advertisements appear shortly before an election in the advertising
market of the electorate and environmental protection is an issue in the
campaign, then the activity might be political. It depends on the facts and
54
circumstances.
An uncertain, facts and circumstances-based definition leads to
compliance and enforcement challenges. Because of potentially severe
55
sanctions, some organizations are wary of engaging in conduct that may
be close to the line. As definitional uncertainty increases, so too does the
reluctance of organizations to participate in activity that would ultimately
not be prohibited or limited and that may be consistent with the
organization’s mission. A facts and circumstances test also is difficult for
the Service to enforce consistently, raising charges and perceptions of
56
political bias or selective enforcement.
Further complicating matters, the definition is not consistent across
sections of the Code. Political activity has subtly different meanings

50

Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 1670.
52
See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328; see also Elizabeth Kingsley & John
Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in
Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
55 (2004) (summarizing the tax law defining political activity).
53
See I.R.S. TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, Pub. No.
1828, at 7–8 (Nov. 2013).
54
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
55
The sanction for a charitable organization for engaging in any political activity is
loss of charitable status. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 504(a).
56
See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATION MATTERS 19 (Comm. Print 2000); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke:
Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4–13 (2007).
51
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depending on whether the context is denying a deduction or evaluating the
58
tax-exempt status of the organization. Organizations cannot assume that
the same activity, which is not political for one purpose, will be treated the
same way for all purposes. Variation in the law can also be hard for the
Service, which has to train agents to know and apply the law consistently
across areas of the Code. Moreover, different definitions of political activity
can lead to a form of statutory arbitrage in which activity is structured to fit
within one definition but not another.
B. Problems Arising from the Legal Architecture
Regardless of how political activity is defined, the issues raised by
political activity are very different depending on the type of organization
involved. Broadly speaking, there are three categories of tax-exempt
organizations that matter in this context: the charity (organized under
59
section 501(c)(3)), the political organization (organized under section
527), and the rest (typically organized under sections 501(c)(4), (c)(5), or
60
(c)(6)), and referred to in this article as the “noncharitable exempt”).
1.

The 501(c)(3) Organization

For the 501(c)(3) charity, the problem of political activity has a deep
historical pedigree. The federal income tax exemption for charitable
organizations borrowed extensively from English common law and the law
of trusts. In England, a charitable (and exempt) trust generally could not be
61
organized for political purposes. It was a point of debate whether political
57

I.R.C. § 162(e).
Although the definition of political activity is broadly similar across section 501(c)
and under section 527, there are differences. Section 527 is broader because it includes
political activity relating to appointed offices (not just elected), including relating to judges.
Further, some activity that is considered political for purposes of section 527 of the Code is
considering lobbying for other Code sections. See Aprill, supra note 8, at 375.
59
Section 501(c)(3) covers more than charitable organizations, also including
educational, religious, scientific, literary, and public safety organizations. In this article, use
of the term “charity” or “charitable organization” includes all organizations described in
section 501(c)(3) eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions under section 170.
60
This noncharitable exempt category technically includes any 501(c) organization
except for organizations eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions, i.e., 501(c)(3)
(except for public safety organizations), fraternal organizations (501(c)(10)), cemetery
companies (501(c)(13)), veterans organizations (501(c)(17)). As stated in text, however, for
purposes of this Article, the term “noncharitable exempt” generally refers to 501(c)(4),
501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations.
61
Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws,
58
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62

activity was permitted to attain a charitable purpose. The 1913 U.S.
income tax statute allowing exemption for charities did not address the
63
question. In 1954, though, Congress decided unequivocally that charity
and political activity are mutually exclusive, and enacted a prohibition on
64
political activity by charities (political activities prohibition).
The political activities prohibition is longstanding but controversial. As
a matter of tax administration and compliance, definitional issues often
65
frame the debate. More broadly, the fact of a prohibition perennially
raises concerns under the First Amendment, particularly in the context of
66
political activity by churches. Further, many challenge the underlying
policy of a prohibition and argue that charitable organizations should be
67
permitted into the public square. Others strongly support the prohibition,
arguing that without it, charitable organizations would be hijacked for
68
partisan objectives at the expense of their charitable purposes. The
Supreme Court has indirectly weighed in on the constitutional question,
69
upholding broadly analogous limits on the lobbying activity of charities.

69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). Note that purpose here legally is distinct from activity — a
regular source of confusion.
62
Id. at 7-8; see also Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for
Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 346 (1990).
63
The Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16 § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
64
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
65
See e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want to Develop Rules Regarding
Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 647 (2012); Donald B. Tobin, Political
Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for
Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1350 (2007).
66
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens,
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2009).
67
See Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign
Activities by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2007). For
additional discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of
Citizens United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 688 (2012).
68
Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561
(2013); Tobin, supra note 65.
69
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). In Taxation
with Representation, the Court likened the charitable tax exemption to a subsidy and said
that as a condition of a subsidy, the lobbying limitations were allowed. The concurring
opinion emphasized the importance of alternative exempt structures to the constitutional
analysis, noting that organizations seeking substantial lobbying activity could organize under
section 501(c)(4). The Court subsequently has relied on the reasoning in the TWR
concurrence. For discussion of the effects of Citizens United on the constitutionality of the
political activities prohibition, see ABA Section of Taxation Comments on Proposed
Regulations Regarding Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on
Candidate-Related Political Activities (May 7, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content
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Regardless of one’s position in this debate, when discussing political
activity and tax exemption it is important to differentiate between charities
and other exempt organizations. Not only are the issues raised by a
prohibition distinct, but more centrally, the political activities prohibition
reflects a clear tax policy. Because contributions to section 501(c)(3)
70
organizations are deductible as charitable contributions,
absent a
prohibition, political contributions by individuals for charitable
electioneering would become deductible.
Thus, Service enforcement of the political activities prohibition is
important and required, both to protect the tax base and to preserve the
integrity of charitable purposes. Put differently, the political activities
prohibition is one of the main borders enacted by Congress to separate the
charitable from the noncharitable sphere, and the Service quite
appropriately bears responsibility for policing that border.
2.

The 527 Political Organization

For the political organization, the problem is entirely different. A
political organization, as the term suggests, is one set up specifically to
71
engage in political activity. The political organization includes political
parties, political committees established by candidates, and political groups
72
that are independent from a party or candidate.
The 1913 income tax statute ignored the political organization. The
question of how to tax a political organization fell to the Service, which
determined that political organizations were pass-through entities —
73
vehicles to collect and spend political contributions. Under that conduit
conception, as discussed in Part II, no economic income was generated at

/dam/aba/administrative/taxation/policy/050714comments.authcheckdam.pdf;
Colinvaux
supra note 67; Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and
Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity
Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867 (2011).
70
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2).
71
The organization must be “organized and operated primarily for the purpose of
directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt
function.” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
72
“The term “political organization” means a party, committee, association, fund, or
other organization (whether or not incorporated) . . .” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). All PACs (political
action committees) are political organizations whether or not connected to a party or
candidate.
73
For discussions of the history of the tax treatment of political organization, see
Colinvaux, supra note 24, at 534–36; Streng, supra note 19; Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous
Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611 (2003).

2014]

Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption

21
74

the organizational level so tax exemption was appropriate. The Service
also concluded, however, that the investment income was “new” income,
75
and should therefore be subject to tax.
Eventually, uncertainty about the tax treatment of political
organizations (in large part involving application of the gift tax to political
76
organization donors) led Congress to enact section 527 in 1975. This
section of the Code provided for the exclusive tax treatment of the political
77
organization, and largely codified the Service’s administrative practice of
exemption for contribution income and taxation for investment (and other)
78
income. Congress also clarified against Service trends that donors to
79
political organizations were not subject to gift tax, and that contributions
of appreciated property to a political organization would result in income
80
tax on the appreciation.
The problem caused by the political activity of a political organization
does not, however, have much to do with this broadly correct tax treatment.
Rather, the problem surfaced in the late 1990s because of differences in the
way in which political activity was defined under federal election law and
federal tax law. Campaign operatives discovered that the federal tax law
definition under section 527 was broader than the one in federal election
81
law. The significance was that if activity could be designed to avoid the
“political” label under federal election law, but still have sufficient political
impact to be considered political activity for tax law purposes, registration
with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) could be avoided yet section

74

See Rev. Rul. 54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11 (explaining that if income was diverted for
personal use of the candidate, then there was income).
75
See Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14.
76
The Service encouraged Congress to act. See Streng, supra note 19, at 143.
77
See I.R.C. § 527(e)(1); FSA 200037040 (noting the mandatory status of section 527
with respect to the law before changes in the year 2000).
78
I.R.C. § 527. In the legislative history, Congress noted that “political activity
(including the financing of political activity) as such is not a trade or business which is
appropriately subject to tax.” S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7502 (1974).
79
I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4). The legislative history provides that it was “inappropriate to
apply the gift tax to political contributions because the tax system should not be used to
reduce or restrict political contributions.” S. Rep. No. 93-1357, at 7508 (1974). At the same
time, Congress decided that contributions of appreciated property to a political organization
should trigger tax on the appreciation. Id.
80
See I.R.C. § 84.
81
Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 To Design a New Campaign
Finance Vehicle, 26 THE EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 205 (1999); see also Aprill, supra note 8,
at 385.
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527 treatment achieved. Crucially, this meant that the organization would
82
not have to disclose the identities of its donors publically.
At the time, these types of political organizations were referred to as
“stealth PACs.” They were political action committees (PACs) because
they qualified as political organizations, and “stealth” because of no donor
disclosure. The type of activity they engaged in became known as “issue
advocacy.” Because the advocacy was not “express” it escaped FEC
regulation. However, because the advocacy was sufficiently political, it
retained the political label for tax law purposes.
Congress acted to address the stealth PAC issue advocacy disclosure
83
loophole in the year 2000. Instead of amending the campaign finance law
to broaden its coverage, Congress instead changed section 527 to require
donor disclosure for political organizations, along with other public notice
84
requirements. The duties imposed by the new tax rules were intended to
85
mimic federal election law. Nondisclosure, though, would result in
86
increased tax liability (assessed and collected as a penalty). In effect, the
tax treatment of a noncompliant 527 organization became punitive.
Accordingly, for the Service, the central problem of the political
organization dates to the year 2000, when Congress tasked the Service with
87
what should be a function of the FEC. From then on, the Service was
responsible for managing 527 disclosure rules by ensuring the publicity of
donor information and enforcing the consequences of noncompliance.
3.

Noncharitable Exempt Organizations: the 501(c)(4), (5), and (6)

Apart from the charity and the political organization, the Code
recognizes a slew of other exemption categories. For example, section
88
501(c) lists twenty-nine different types. Other Code sections provide for

82

See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 949, 959 (2005).
83
Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Require 527 Organizations to
Disclose Their Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000). Congress
amended this legislation in 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-276, 116 Stat. 1929 (2002). The author
worked on the amendments to the legislation.
84
I.R.C. § 527(i), (j). As discussed infra, Congress appears to have chosen to amend
the tax law to shelter the amendments from constitutional challenge.
85
See e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87
B.U. L. REV. 625, 646 n.103 (2007).
86
I.R.C. § 527(j)(1).
87
As Professor Aprill has said, “the amendments to section 527 are campaign finance
laws in tax clothing.” Aprill, supra note 34, at 391.
88
I.R.C. § 501(c).
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89

tax exemption as well. The main ones of interest are the social welfare
organization (501(c)(4)), the labor union (501(c)(5)), and the trade
association (501(c)(6)).
In general, noncharitable exempt organizations are exempt from paying
90
federal income tax, but pay tax on unrelated business income.
Importantly, unlike contributions to a charity, contributions to noncharitable
exempts are not deductible as charitable contributions. Contributions may,
however, be deductible as business expenses. This could occur, for
91
example, if the contribution takes the form of member dues.
Also unlike a charity, noncharitable exempts are permitted to engage
92
in political activity, but political activity is deemed not to further
noncharitable exempt purposes. Because noncharitable exempts are
organized for a specific purpose articulated by statute (e.g., social welfare,
labor, promotion of trade), the extent of political activity is not allowed to
engulf the organization’s primary purpose. In other words, the definitional
category of the noncharitable exempt provides a sort of built-in cap on the
amount of political activity. Organizations that exceed the cap may become
political organizations under section 527, assuming their primary purpose is
93
political activity.
The rules for noncharitable exempts –– some political activity is
allowed, just not too much –– largely worked (or simply escaped much
94
notice) before the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. Before
Citizens United, the meaningful cap was not imposed by tax law but by
campaign finance law, which directly restrained the ability of corporations
and labor unions to engage in independent political activity. By allowing
unlimited independent express advocacy by corporations (and labor
unions), Citizens United expanded their legal power by permitting an
activity previously banned.

89

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 528 (exemption for homeowners associations).
The tax rules are not uniform. Some noncharitable exempts pay tax on investment
income, or have special rules for treating unrelated business taxable income. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(7) (social clubs). Charitable organizations also pay tax on unrelated business
income. I.R.C. § 511.
91
I.R.C. § 162.
92
Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (providing that an organization “may carry on
lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4) as long as it is
primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969) (providing that 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) organizations face similar
constraints as 501(c)(4) organizations). Other noncharitable exempts likely are the same
though the authority is fleeting. See Aprill, supra note 34, at 381.
93
I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
94
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
90
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The consequences are significant. Before Citizens United, tax
95
classifications largely reflected reality.
Organizations that sought
noncharitable exempt status would not be likely to engage in much political
activity, relative to other activities. The issue was not that noncharitable
exempt purposes and political activity were mutually exclusive, rather that
the campaign finance limits on political activity meant that for an
independent organization with nonpolitical activity as an objective, the
nonpolitical activity would be the main one, almost by definition. The preCitizens United world largely was one of black and white, political or not.
To the extent a noncharitable exempt engaged in political activity, the
96
activity would be incidental to the main purpose.
After Citizens United, however, organizations have a choice that did
not exist before. An organization may now pursue a noncharitable exempt
purpose and engage in unlimited independent political activity. The choice
is available to both newly forming organizations and existing noncharitable
exempts. Further, formation as a for-profit political organization also
becomes more viable in light of the ability to engage in unlimited
independent expenditures. In effect, Citizens United has paved the way for a
new type of entity not readily recognized by existing tax law
97
classifications.
Nevertheless, when the new mix of activity allowed by Citizens United
is layered on top of the current tax exemption system, the noncharitable
exempt form becomes attractive relative to the political organization. Most
importantly, the noncharitable exempt form allows organizations to
98
expressly advocate without donor disclosure. By contrast, a political
99
organization must disclose donors.

95

One pre-Citizens United issue was that organizations that might otherwise qualify as
a noncharitable exempt could plan into section 527 by emphasizing political purposes in
order to avoid possible imposition of the gift tax. For donors not concerned about anonymity,
the 2000 legal changes did not alter this incentive. For additional discussion, see Polsky,
supra note 10, at 1782.
96
The inverse also is accurate. Political organizations generally do not engage in
nonpolitical activity.
97
To use a well-worn metaphor, before Citizens United, the horse (the exempt
purpose) would pull the cart (political activity, if any). By unleashing a new form of political
activity, Citizens United made it possible for the cart to come before the horse.
98
The general rule of exempt organizations is not to disclose publicly donor
information. The exception is for donors to private foundations and political organizations.
I.R.C. § 6104(d).
99
I.R.C. § 527(j).
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In addition, after commencing gift tax audits on 501(c)(4)
100
organizations, the Service responded to Congressional pressure
and
announced that, after all, it would not assert gift tax against donors to
101
501(c)(4) (and presumably other noncharitable exempt) organizations.
This made the noncharitable exempt category even more attractive by
largely equating the tax treatment of noncharitable exempts with political
organizations, leaving the disclosure rules as the salient difference between
102
the two.
The obstacle to choosing (or working within) the noncharitable exempt
form then becomes the requirement of tax law that the political activity of a
noncharitable exempt not be the primary activity. As a result, after Citizens
United, the “primarily” legal standard for noncharitable exemption has
faced considerable pressure. Newly formed organizations can claim
(genuinely or not) to have primarily a nonpolitical purpose, but still engage
103
in a lot of political activity.
Thus, the Service must make a judgment
about a nascent organization’s true purpose. In addition, existing
organizations interested in exercising their newly found freedom need to
know how much political activity is too much. Accordingly, the Service
actually has to apply the “primarily” test.

100

For years, the IRS did not enforce the gift tax for transfers to 501(c)(4)
organizations. For discussion of the many issues concerning the gift tax and political
activity, see Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4)
Organizations: Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2012).
101
IRS Suspends Exams on Application of Gift Tax to Contributions Made to Some
Exempt Orgs. 2011 TNT 131-18 (July 8, 2011); compare Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220
(holding that “gratuitous transfers to persons other than organizations described in section
527(e) of the Code are subject to the gift tax absent any specific statute to the contrary, even
though the transfers may be motivated by a desire to advance the donor’s own social,
political, or charitable goals”).
102
This assumes levels of political activity below the “primarily” threshold. In addition,
contributions of appreciated property are ignored for tax purposes if made to a noncharitable
exempt, but trigger income tax to the donor on the appreciation if made to a political
organization. I.R.C. § 84. Accordingly, absent enforcement of the gift tax, the noncharitable
exempt form overall is more attractive for tax purposes than the political organization. See
infra notes 199-206.
103
Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to
the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 438 (2011); Democracy 21 and Campaign
Legal Center Call on IRS to Investigate Crossroads GPS to Determine if Group is
Improperly Claiming 501(c)(4) Tax Status to Avoid Disclosing Its Donors to the Public (Oct.
5, 2010), http://www.democracy21.org/archives/whats-new/democracy-21-and-campaignlegal-center-call-on-irs-to-investigate-crossroads-gps-to-determine-if-group-is-improperlyclaiming-501c4-tax-status-to-avoid-disclosing-its-donors-to-the-public/#.
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Citizens United therefore forcefully magnified the problem of how to
administer the quantum of political activity permitted to noncharitable
exempt organizations. The notorious result was the Service targeting
scandal. The Service was accused of selecting certain organizations for
extra scrutiny based on the name and likely political orientation of the
104
group. Regardless of management failures or other errors, however, the
basic issue facing the Service was (and is) legitimate. As the tax
administrator, the Service must assign a label to an exempt organization
based on the extent and nature of its political activity. Thus, the problem of
the political activity of noncharitable exempts is inherent to the legal
architecture after Citizens United, and not a conspiracy. The problem also is
in need of a solution.
4.

Networks of Exempt Organizations

Finally, the problems raised by the political activity of exempt
organizations is enhanced by complex structures of exempts. A 501(c)(3)
charity might establish a related 501(c)(4) social welfare group, which in
turn might set up a separate segregated fund that is treated as a 527 political
organization. Although such arrangements may be constitutionally
105
requisite, as a matter of tax administration, the Service must look at the
entire organization. For instance, deductible donations to a charity must not
flow through to a controlled 501(c)(4) organization to finance political
activity. Networks of exempt organizations also highlight compliance
problems raised by a nonuniform definition of political activity.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The problems raised by the political activity of tax-exempt
organizations give rise to a number of possible solutions. Administratively,
106
the Service and the Treasury Department
have the authority to take a
107
number of steps. Some stakeholders have for years urged the government
104

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA
WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW.
105
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). But see
Galle, supra note 68, at 1631–32 (arguing that the 501(c)(4) loophole may no longer be
constitutionally required).
106
The Treasury Department has the authority to issue regulations. The Service
provides other forms of guidance such as Revenue Rulings. For convenience, “Service”
when used here may also include the Treasury Department and vice versa.
107
I.R.C. § 7805. For a discussion regarding the authority of the Treasury to issue
regulations in the area, and consideration of constitutional concerns, see ABA Tax Section
Comments supra note 69.
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108

to issue more guidance in the area. Congress too has placed unflinching
pressure on the Service. Prior to the recent scandal, the Service also had
109
made efforts to enforce the area in a more public and deliberate manner.
The question is what Treasury and the Service can do now to address the
problems and provide greater certainty in the law and more consistent
enforcement.
A. Quantum-Based Solutions
One approach would be to focus on the thresholds for permitted
political activity, or more broadly, on nonexempt activity. Current law
thresholds could be made more precise, changed, or both.
1.

A Bright Line Approach

Current regulations in the 501(c)(4) area declare that “[t]he promotion
110
of social welfare does not include [political activity]”
making political
activity by definition nonexempt. The limit on nonexempt activity of any
type is set by a “primarily” test. The regulations provide that the social
welfare purpose is met if the organization is “primarily engaged in
promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the
111
people of the community.” Put another way, “the organization’s primary
112
activities [must] promote social welfare.”
What the “primarily” test means in practice, however, has long been a
source of contention. The conventional wisdom is that a 501(c)(4) will not
lose exempt status as a (c)(4) so long as at least fifty-one percent of its
113
activities are in pursuit of social welfare.
Although there is no formal
114
guidance to this effect, it is a rule of thumb used by Service agents. Some

108

See, e.g., Gregory L. Colvin, Political Tax Law After Citizens United: A Time for
Reform, 66 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 71 (2010); Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 52.
109
See Political Activity Compliance Initiative (2008 Election), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irstege/FY2011_Workplan_Political_Activities_Project_Excerpt.pdf.
110
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990).
111
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1990).
112
Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
113
Cautious practitioners would set the current law threshold lower, however. See
Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of
501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 168 (2006).
114
Lindsey McPherson, EO Training Materials Suggest 51 Percent Threshold for
Social Welfare Activity, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 13–15 (Jan. 21, 2014) (suggesting that the
Service staff calculate the meaning of primary as fifty-one percent of expenditures for
exempt activities).
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courts take a more restrictive approach, however, concluding that
115
nonexempt activities must not be “substantial.”
Yet, even if the Service’s informal rule of fifty-one percent exempt
activities is accepted, it is unclear how to apply the test. Is it fifty-one
percent of expenditures? Does or should effort or the time spent by
116
volunteers count? Is there room for a qualitative assessment? Indeed, the
presence of this informal and ambiguous test is one of the culprits in the
targeting scandal, opening the door for organizations to exploit legal
117
uncertainty and claim 501(c)(4) status.
Accordingly, one approach would be to define a primarily threshold for
noncharitable exempts using a mechanical bright-line. A model would be
the regulations in the section 501(c)(3) area that articulate in great detail the
118
permitted amount of lobbying.
For example, regulations could specify
the exact amount of expenditures allowed for political activity in relation to
119
expenses,
place caps on the amount of time spent by the organization,
and attempt also to measure the impact of endorsements and other activities
that may have a high impact but low expense. Some working definition of
political activity also would have to be adopted.
The promise of greater certainty and perhaps compliance under such an
approach, however, must also be balanced by recognition that a detailed
regulatory regime to assess the “primarily” threshold implies a much more
115

See Vision Service Plan v. United States, No. CIVS041993LKKJFM, 2005 WL
3406321 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005).
116
The Service has described the test as a facts and circumstances determination.
Factors include funds and time (including volunteer time) spent, other resources used, and
the manner in which the activities are conducted. See Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey,
Political Organizations and IRC 501(c)(4), EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995, 192 (1995). As
Professor Aprill notes, “[a]dvisors differ widely in how much politicking they believe
section 501(c) organizations . . . can undertake without endangering their exempt status.”
Aprill, supra note 34, at 382.
117
Dylan Matthews, Crossroads GPS and Priorities USA Were Created for the
Purpose of Hiding Donors, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (May 15, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/15/crossroads-gps-andpriorities-usa-were-created-for-the-purpose-of-hiding-donors/ (discussing the various
interpretations of the “primary activity test” and describing how Crossroads GPS and other
groups whose principal purpose is to fund political campaigns were organized as 501(c)(4)
organizations).
118
Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-1 to -10. The organization can elect into this regulatory
regime or instead be subject to a “substantially all” facts and circumstances test. I.R.C. §
501(h).
119
There are multiple proposals. See e.g., Aprill, supra note 34, at 382 (advocating a
ten–fifteen percent of activity limit); ABA Tax Section Comments, supra note 69
(suggesting an amount “somewhere between insubstantial (but not zero) and 40%”).
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robust enforcement presence by the Service, including a need for additional
resources. This would increase administrative burdens on the Service and
have the perhaps perverse effect of involving the Service more deeply —
not less — in political activity questions. Notably, the 501(c)(4) proposed
regulations demur on this issue, and decline to provide guidance on the
120
question of what constitutes “primarily.”
Moreover, it would be difficult legally in the noncharitable exempt
context to segregate political activity from other nonexempt activity. The
“primarily” test of current law is directed to all nonexempt activity, not just
political activity. Although a threshold could be adopted (e.g., no more than
ten percent, forty percent, etc.), it would have to account for political and
other nonexempt activity, which would make for an even more complex
test. Although a threshold specifically directed to political activity could in
theory be imposed, doing so would be arbitrary. Why single out one
nonexempt activity from another for a separate cap and a mechanical test?
One of the reasons the detailed regulatory regime for lobbying in the
501(c)(3) context is workable is because lobbying is subject to a distinct
121
statutory limitation. There is no statutory language in 501(c)(4) on which
to base specific political activity limits. Further, as discussed more below,
thresholds below fifty-one percent generally would create an undesirable
gap between noncharitable exempt and political organizations.
2.

Change “Primarily” to “Substantially” or “Exclusively”

A related quantum-based solution would be to change the regulatory
standard from “primarily” to something else. For example, to qualify as a
noncharitable exempt organization, regulations could provide that the
organization must be “exclusively” or “substantially” engaged in its exempt
122
purpose. The basis for such a change would be a reinterpretation of the
language of the tax statute, which provides, for example, that a 501(c)(4)
organization must be organized and operated “exclusively” for social
123
welfare. The Code does not say “primarily.” Indeed, in the wake of the

120

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013).
Lobbying may not be a “substantial part” of activities. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (h).
122
An interpretation of “primarily” that required far more than a majority of activities
to be in furtherance of exempt purposes could have the same effect without changing the
terminology.
123
Similar reinterpretations would be required for other noncharitable exempts, which
often explicitly or implicitly follow the lead of section 501(c)(4). See BRUCE R. HOPKINS,
THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 80 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that the terms
“substantial” and “exclusive” have been subsumed into the term “primary” for purposes of
imposing a primary purpose test that “[I]s generally applicable to all categories of exempt
121
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targeting scandal, the “primarily” test of the regulations has been criticized
as agency overreach and an improper interpretation of congressional
124
intent.
Although it should be within Treasury Department authority to
125
reconsider the “primarily” standard for exempt status,
there are
additional complicating factors. As discussed, the “primarily” standard
applies to more than political activity, so changing the exemption
thresholds, if the intent is just to limit political activity, in fact has broader
effects.
Further, “exclusively” in the statute is a term of art, with origins in
section 501(c)(3). Under section 501(c)(3), a charitable organization must
be organized and operated “exclusively” for charitable purposes. Yet in
1945, the Supreme Court found in Better Business Bureau of Washington,
126
D.C. v. United States
that an insubstantial nonexempt purpose was
127
consistent with tax exemption under an “exclusively” standard.
The
Treasury regulations for section 501(c)(3) subsequently adopted a nonliteral
128
construction, providing that “exclusively” means primarily.
This is the
129
standard generally adopted in the 501(c)(4) regulations in 1959.
Although the Service could adopt a standard based more directly on Better
130
Business Bureau, or even on the 501(c)(3) regulations,
anything more
restrictive would be problematic.
organizations.”).
124
See Press Release, Democracy 21, Rep. Van Hollen and Watchdog Groups File
Lawsuit Challenging Flawed IRS Regulations (Aug. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.democracy21.org/money-in-politics/letters-to-the-irs/rep-van-hollen-andwatchdog-groups-file-lawsuit-challenging-flawed-irs-regulations/.
125
There could be objections that because the standard is over half a century old,
Congress has acquiesced in the change. See Galston, supra note 113, at 171 (noting,
however, that it is unlikely Congress acquiesced to the regulation or to any specific
allowable percentage of activity); ABA Tax Section Comments, supra note 69 (arguing that
Treasury has authority with respect to the Proposed Regulations).
126
326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (holding that “the presence of a single [nonexempt]
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or
importance of truly [exempt] purposes”).
127
Better Business Bureau was phrased in terms of purposes, not activities, leaving the
question of both the extent of permissible purposes and activities open. For additional
discussion of the purposes-activities distinction, see Galston supra note 113, at 169.
128
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2008) (providing that “[a]n organization will be
regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages
primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes”).
129
For an excellent discussion of the evolution and meaning of the standard, see
Galston, supra note 113.
130
The 501(c)(3) regulations contain a regulatory gloss on “primarily” that was not
adopted by the 501(c)(4) regulations, namely that “[a]n organization will not be so regarded
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Even discounting the effect of Better Business Bureau and the
501(c)(3) regulations, Congress has also adopted a nonliteral understanding
131
of the term “exclusively.” Although Congress used the word in 1913,
132
when it passed the unrelated business income tax in 1950,
it made a
literal interpretation of “exclusively” by the Treasury Department
impossible. The imposition of a tax on the business income of exempt
organizations carries with it the implicit permission to engage in activity
133
that is not related to exempt purposes.
In other words, pursuit of an
unrelated trade or business activity is by definition not to engage
“exclusively” in an exempt purpose. The quantum of unrelated business
activities that is consistent with exempt status is determined under the
“primarily” and “insubstantial” test of the 501(c)(3) regulations, and is very
134
open-ended.

if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.”
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2008). In other words, for section 501(c)(3), “primarily” is
defined in part based on a “substantially” test. These conflicting directives reflect the
Treasury’s own uncertainty about the scope of permitted nonexempt activity. “Treasury
determined that it could not legally support the position that an organization could lose its
exempt status as a result of substantial unrelated business activity.” Thomas A. Troyer,
Quantity of Unrelated Business Consistent with Charitable Exemption – Some Clarification,
56 TAX NOTES 1075, 1076 (August 24, 1992).
131
Tariff Act of 1913, Section II G(a), chapter 16, 63d Cong., 38 Stat. 114, 172.
132
The Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 64 Stat. 906. In 1950, the unrelated
business income tax (UBIT) applied to 501(c)(3), 501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations. In
1969 the tax was extended to 501(c)(4) organizations and many other noncharitable exempts.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. So although the 1959 social
welfare regulations were not adopted with the UBIT as a direct concern, a literal
interpretation of “exclusively” in light of the effect of UBIT on other exemption provisions
would have been difficult.
133
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 49 n.70 (Joint Comm. Print 2005) (concluding that “[a]s a practical matter,
if ‘exclusively were construed by regulations in its ordinary sense, an organization would not
be permitted to engage in unrelated business income tax activities, rendering the unrelated
business income tax rules moot”).
134
There is no quantitative limit on the unrelated business activities of a 501(c)(3)
organization. The standard (for a charitable organization) is whether the organization
conducts a charitable program “commensurate in scope” with its financial resources. Rev.
Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. As explained by the Service, the primary purpose test is
“essentially a test of proof . . . whether there is a real, bona fide, or genuine charitable
purpose, as manifested by the charitable accomplishments of the organization, and not a
mathematical measuring of business purposes as opposed to charitable purpose.” I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 32,689 (Oct. 6, 1963) (emphasis added). For additional discussion, see Troyer,
supra note 130.
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Nevertheless, the Treasury Department could attempt to develop
thresholds for political activity that are different than the thresholds for
135
other unrelated activity.
For example, the “primarily” interpretation of
“exclusively” could be retained for all nonexempt activity, and a
“substantially” interpretation of “exclusively” for political activity.
“Substantially” could be defined according to the facts and circumstances,
or pursuant to a detailed and mechanical regulatory regime (with the
attendant pros and cons discussed above).
All of that said, the reason to adopt a “substantially” test would be to
advance a policy to limit the political activity of noncharitable exempts
relative to current law. This goal, however, may be misguided. The result
would be to create a sort of “no man’s land” for certain mixes of activities,
which may not be sustainable.
For example, what would happen to organizations that exceed the
“substantial” threshold for political activity, but do not engage in enough
political activity to qualify as a political organization? Presumably, such
organizations would lose noncharitable exempt status and become fully
taxable nonprofits. It would be an odd system though, not to mention
irrational and perhaps unconstitutional, to treat those organizations worse
than political organizations from a tax perspective because they engage in
less political activity. Furthermore, the administrative burden on the Service
would increase because of the addition of yet another line to police — that
between the noncharitable exempt, the taxable nonprofit, and the political
organization.
Another related alternative is that the term “exclusively,” as applied to
the political activity of 501(c)(4) (and other noncharitable exempt)
organizations, should mean exclusively. Given the rule that political activity
does not further noncharitable exempt purposes, no political activity should
be allowed. One benefit of a literal “exclusively” standard relative to a
“substantially” standard is easier policing. There would be no need to
decide how much is too much. However, the tax disparities created would
be even larger than under a “substantially” standard: a peppercorn of
political activity would result in fully taxable status, but a lot of political
activity would receive more favorable treatment under section 527.
Furthermore, section 501(c)(4) must be read together with its close
cousin, section 501(c)(3). In section 501(c)(3), Congress wrote an express
prohibition on political activity into the Code. Thus, there is a strong

135

As noted above, it is unclear whether the Treasury has the authority to bifurcate the
statutory term “exclusively” in such a way, and a legislative change may be required. It is
one thing to conclude that particular activities do or do not further social welfare within the
meaning of the statute, and another to impose a limit on a particular activity.

2014]

Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption

33

negative implication from the presence of the express prohibition in section
501(c)(3) and the absence of one in section 501(c)(4).
In addition, the need for the express prohibition on political activity in
136
section 501(c)(3) also demonstrates that prior 501(c)(3) law, which used
“exclusively” as the test for exemption, did not prohibit political activity
through this word. Instead, an express prohibition was needed. In short, it
would be an odd reading indeed of section 501(c)(4) to interpret
“exclusively” to contain a prohibition on political activity, when section
501(c)(3) also uses the term “exclusively” for exemption purposes and
contains an express prohibition.
3.

Eliminate Definitional Limits on the Political Activity of Noncharitable
Exempts

Another quantum-based approach would be to revisit whether there
should be a definitional limitation on the political activity of noncharitable
exempt organizations. The basis for the present law limitations is the
regulatory declaration that political activity does not further exempt
137
purposes.
On its face, the conclusion seems absurd. A social welfare
lobby group (501(c)(4)), a labor union (501(c)(5)), and a trade association
(501(c)(6)) all plainly have political aspects that are directly connected to
their exempt purposes.
For a social welfare lobby organization that promotes gun rights to
advocate for a candidate in favor of gun control makes sense. For a labor
union to favor a pro-union political candidate over another undoubtedly
would serve labor purposes. For a trade association that promotes a
particular industry, preferring the business candidate over the populist
would seem to be in direct furtherance of its exempt purpose. Further, each
type of organization may and does establish separate political organizations
— convincing evidence that pursuing political activity furthers underlying
organizational purposes. The law makes nonsense of reality by defining
political activity as incompatible with noncharitable exempt purposes. Is
there a good reason?

136

That is, the law prior to the enactment of the political activities prohibition in 1954.
For example, the regulations for social welfare organizations explicitly provide that
political activity does not further social welfare. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990)
(“The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or
intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office.”). The proposed regulations modify this part of the regulations, replacing the current
use of the section 501(c)(3) standard for political activity with a new definition of political
activity, distinct for section 501(c)(4). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg.
71,535, 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013).
137
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Interestingly, the rationale behind the regulatory conclusion that
political activity categorically does not further social welfare is
138
unknown.
One explanation is that political activity, unlike lobbying,
ultimately serves the private ends of a candidate, whose personal mission
and benefit may be far removed from the noncharitable exempt purposes of
an organization. Thus, the Service has reasoned in the context of 501(c)(5)
and 501(c)(6) organizations that “support of a candidate for public office
necessarily involves the organization in the total political attitudes and
139
positions of the candidate.”
That conclusion seems debatable. Support
for a political candidate need not mean reverence or identity. Further, it
simply is not clear why the fact that a candidate has positions on multiple
issues means that political support for the candidate by an exempt
organization by definition cannot also advance the organization’s mission.
Most likely, the reasoning of the Service and the regulations is rooted
in the parallel relationship between section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4). The
“promotion of social welfare” is a charitable purpose under the section
140
501(c)(3) regulations. Charities of course are prohibited from engaging
in political activity. The 501(c)(3) rules make for an easy leap to conclude
that political activity by definition is not charitable, and so also does not
further social welfare for purposes of 501(c)(4).
However, the Treasury could not prohibit political activity in the
501(c)(4) regulations because doing so would be inconsistent with the
141
statute.
Further, for the Treasury to acknowledge that political activity
could be in furtherance of social welfare, or other noncharitable exempt
purpose, would be to introduce a difficult inquiry into whether the political
142
activity was “related” or “unrelated.” Whether for those reasons or not,
the regulations take a middle ground. By declaring that political activity

138

See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 52, at 73 n.83.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969). See also American Campaign
Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989) (ruling that an organization that ran an
educational program that trained campaign workers did not qualify under 501(c)(3) because
of impermissible private benefit to Republican candidates and entities). Professor Miriam
Galston argues that the assumption of the regulations that political activity does not further
social welfare is “debatable” in cases of a single issue candidate, but stronger when political
candidates take positions on issues outside the scope of an organization’s mission. Galston,
supra note 113, at 170.
140
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2008).
141
See discussion supra text accompanying note 136.
142
In 1959 the Treasury was dealing with just such a “related-unrelated” inquiry in the
context of a trade or business. Trade or business activity is allowed without limit, so long as
it is “related” to the exempt purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2008); see also Troyer,
supra note 130.
139
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does not further exempt purposes, the regulations avoid a “relatedunrelated” inquiry, but achieve a limitation, set by the “primarily” test.
Yet the conclusion that political activity does not further exempt
143
purposes under section 501(c)(3)
reflects, or should reflect, much
different concerns than a conclusion that political activity does not further
noncharitable exempt purposes. Although it may seem an easy leap, the
chasm between the two sections is wide. The political activities prohibition
of section 501(c)(3) is critical to protect the integrity of the charitable
144
exempt purpose and is tied inextricably to the charitable deduction.
Noncharitable exempts, however, do not receive charitable
145
contributions, and so the exempt purpose does not require nearly as much
“protection” as a matter of tax policy. Quite simply, noncharitable exempts
are not “public benefit” organizations in the same way as a charity. Labor
unions and trade associations, for example, though undoubtedly a positive
force in civil society, are not disinterested public benefit organizations in
the same sense as a 501(c)(3) charity is intended to be. Their purposes have
manifest private or even political overtones. Defining their purpose as
exclusive of political activity for tax reasons seems churlish, especially after
the Supreme Court has allowed unlimited independent expenditures.
On the surface, 501(c)(4) organizations present a stronger case as
“public benefit” organizations. They must serve the social welfare by
“promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the
146
people of the community.”
There is a sense that social welfare
organizations really are engaged in the same type of public benefit activities
as charitable organizations.
In fact, however, the social welfare and charitable organization types
are quite different. The 501(c)(4) is allowed to engage in unlimited
lobbying (as are the (c)(5) and the (c)(6)), some political activity, and has
become a “catchall” exemption category for groups that fail to fit

143

Interestingly, the section 501(c)(3) regulations do not say directly, as do the
501(c)(4) regulations, that political activity does not further social welfare. Rather, the
501(c)(3) regulations provide an indirect route, finding that an organization that engages in
any political activity is an “action” organization, and therefore fails the operational test (is
not operated “exclusively” for exempt purposes). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii)
(2008).
144
No charitable deduction is allowed to an organization that fails the political activities
prohibition. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Other tax benefits are also related to the 501(c)(3)
classification, such as tax-exempt financing. I.R.C. § 145.
145
Veterans organizations, although technically a “noncharitable exempt” are eligible
to receive deductible contributions, but are not subject to the political activities prohibition.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(19) Veterans organizations therefore are hard to categorize.
146
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (1990).
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147

elsewhere. Thus, section 501(c)(4) is a useful classification for nonprofit
lobby groups and local civic organizations that serve a narrow class of
beneficiaries. But the benefit served is less noble and less directly in the
public interest than that of a charity.
Nevertheless, some argue that restrictions on political activity are
necessary to protect against capture of the organization and consequent
148
corruption of its purposes.
It has long been observed that nonprofit
149
organizations are prone to capture because of weak oversight.
Without
shareholders, nonprofit organizations are more open to direction by
managers who might abuse the organization by taking it in personal, private
directions.
Although capture is a legitimate concern, it has more force when
directed to charitable organizations, which are formed in the public interest,
than to noncharitable nonprofits, which tolerate a great deal more “private”
150
interest. Further, the cost to the tax system may be marginal. Depending
on whether the organization has a profit and accumulates funds tax
exemption may not be a significant benefit to the organization or loss to the
151
Treasury.
In addition, many existing noncharitable exempt organizations already
engage in considerable amounts of political activity, which is another way
of saying that capture concerns already exist under present law. Although

147

See James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwartz, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 768 (2d ed. 2006) (referring to 501(c)(4) as a
“dumping ground”).
148
Brain Galle & Donald Tobin, Comments on Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social
Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 6–8 (Ctr. for
Interdisciplinary Law & Pol’y Stud. at the Moritz Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 239,
2014).
149
Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 506–07 (1981).
150
The entire basis of exemption under section 501(c)(6) is to serve the interest of a
league of businesses, i.e., a trade association. The exemption for section 501(c)(4) has long
been believed to have been secured by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 29 (Joint
Comm. Print 2005).
151
It is worth noting that to the extent political activity expenses increase, the exposure
to tax under section 527(f) also increases depending on the amount of the organization’s
investment income. Professor Halperin concludes that the exemption on income for
organizations that accumulate funds could be very significant.
Daniel Halperin, The Tax Exemption under Section 501(c)(4), URBAN INST 3, 5 (2014)
(working paper), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413152-The-TaxExemption-Under-Section-501.pdf.
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removing the definitional limits might make capture worse, it is
questionable whether any increased risk of capture to a noncharitable
exempt is sufficient to justify arbitrary limits on a core activity. Besides, the
risk of capture on a systemic scale seems overblown. Some organization
managers might be swayed to endorse or promote a candidate against the
organization’s interests. To the extent this occurs repeatedly, other doctrines
152
of tax law could be used (such as private benefit)
to revoke an
organization’s exempt status.
Nonetheless, even if many of the standard explanations for the
definitional political activity limits do not appear justified, placing a
definitional limitation on the political activity of noncharitable exempts
does serve to delineate between the noncharitable exempt and the political
organization. In this way, the limitation can be said to protect the integrity
of the noncharitable exempt purpose by making sure that the nonpolitical
153
activity (or purpose) remains “primary.” In other words, for convenience
and perhaps even transparency, an organization’s stated purpose – social
welfare, labor, pursuit of trade, politics – must remain the top purpose,
otherwise the tax classification changes. In short, one tax policy reason to
limit the political activity of noncharitable exempts is to provide
appropriate labels of organizational types.
The labeling function of the definitional limit probably was a sufficient
reason for the limit before Citizens United. Before Citizens United,
campaign finance law banned corporate (and labor union) independent
154
expenditures.
As discussed above, this meant that for a noncharitable
exempt, political activity generally would always be incidental to its main
purpose. In other words, by placing severe limitations on the amount of
permitted political activity, campaign finance law, not tax law, was
155
controlling. The tax law limits largely were superfluous. The pre-Citizens
152

See, e.g., I.R.S., 1981 EO CPE TEXT, G. SOCIAL WELFARE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
HOW MUCH PRIVATE BENEFIT IS PERMISSIBLE? WHAT IS A COMMUNITY? 1 (1981). If
organization funds are used to provide an excess benefit to an insider of a social welfare
organization, then an excise tax applies to the transaction. I.R.C. § 4958.
153
Notably, political organization treatment is based on whether the organization’s
“primary” purpose is to engage in political activity. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
154
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000 ed.); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010).
155
The issue advocacy loophole exploited by some political organizations to avoid the
Federal Election Campaign Act never really spread to the noncharitable exempt, perhaps
because of questions about application of the gift tax, the need to dilute the activity to fit into
the “loophole,” and general uncertainty about the contours of the tax law political activity
limits. As explained by Professor Polsky, before Citizens United and after the 2000 changes,
the main issue was with donors, unconcerned about anonymity, who therefore preferred
section 527 over section 501(c)(4) to be certain of avoiding gift tax. See Polsky, supra note
10, at 1782.
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United world of campaign finance thus fit fairly neatly into the tax law
paradigm of political activity limitations. The definitional and quantumbased limits were helpful in a black and white world, where organizations
either were political, or not.
Now that unlimited independent corporate political activity is allowed,
the tax law definitional approach is outmoded. Noncharitable exempt
groups naturally will and should expect to be able to engage in more
political activity, much of which on any common understanding will be
related to the organization’s purposes. The tax law rules that deem political
activity as not consistent with noncharitable exempt purposes and so subject
to limitation thus seem patently unsound.
Further, once some political activity is allowed by tax law, maintaining
a quantum-based limit in the wake of Citizens United seems arbitrary,
counterproductive, complex, and distracting — especially because the
156
activity in truth will often be a related one. Indeed, definitional limits on
the activity puts a strain on the rule of law. It is like allowing life but
157
decreeing that breathing is not related to existing. The current approach
also forces the Service to have a greater role in regulating political activity,
which as recent events have shown, is a role no one seems to relish.
All that said, from purely a tax perspective, whether or not there are
definitional political activity limits would not even matter much if the
158
labeling function of the exemption categories had no tax consequences.
Then, the political activity limits sensibly could be retained and defended
on the ground that the only tax consequence of exceeding the limit was a
change in tax classification, e.g., from 501(c)(4) to 527. The organization
would have a new tax classification, perhaps one it does not prefer, but one
159
that is intended to reflect the reality of the organization’s operations.
156

See Halperin, supra note 151, at 7 (noting that for some organizations “it is unclear
why participation in a political campaign, to help elect sympathetic candidates, is not a
legitimate means to promote its charitable purpose”). If the stipulation that political activity
does not further social welfare was removed from the regulations, a distinction between
“related” and “unrelated” political activity would be introduced. This distinction exists for
lobbying, or indeed any activity. The presumption however would be that political activity
would further noncharitable exempt purposes. For a discussion of the difficulty of
maintaining a related-unrelated distinction in the context of political activity of charitable
organizations, see Colinvaux, supra note 67, at 749–50.
157
This strain also exists in the context of a charity, but as noted, the other tax benefits
associated with the charity make the charity distinguishable.
158
As discussed below, there are significant consequences relating to disclosure that
hinge on tax classifications. Disclosure rules are not however primarily driven by concerns
of taxation, even though tax law is the vehicle.
159
Note that a shift from noncharitable exempt status to political organization status
should be less important to the organization than a shift from 501(c)(3) status to another
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Under current law, however, there are potentially significant tax
differences between a noncharitable exempt and a political organization.
Broadly, if a noncharitable exempt exceeds the political activity limit and
becomes a political organization, it means a loss of exemption on the
income from the noncharitable exempt purpose (social welfare, labor, trade,
etc.).
The question then is what explains this result. Probably the best
explanation is rooted again in a history of organizations being either
political or not, with campaign finance rules preventing too much of a gray
area. The history of “political organizations” suggests that they were just
that – serving politics and nothing else – i.e., parties and political
committees. The tax treatment followed the facts, with a bright line
160
exempting only political activity income. The unstated assumption must
have been either that political organizations would not engage as a general
matter in nonpolitical activity, or, for simplicity, that they should not be
encouraged to do so. That assumption for a political organization may still
hold true. But now, the opposite problem exists, and bona fide
noncharitable exempts seek to engage in significant political activity.
In short, the loss of exemption on noncharitable exempt purpose
income for engaging in too much political activity was never tested
sufficiently before Citizens United. A genuine mixed noncharitable-political
purpose organization was not enough of a reality, and thus, cross-overs
from social welfare to political status were not a concern for tax purposes.
Now, the facts of organization types have changed, and the issue is raised as
to whether the exempt status of the noncharitable exempt purpose income
should depend on the quantum of political activity.
In the wake of Citizens United, the answer is no. Ideally, there should
be no tax consequence to a noncharitable exempt for exceeding what
amount to arbitrary limits on an important and generally related activity. In
other words, so far as the tax law is concerned, the definitional limitations
161
on the political activity of noncharitable exempts should be eliminated.
As discussed in the next paragraph, however, this preferred outcome for tax

exemption category. This is not only because loss of 501(c)(3) status entails loss of tax
benefits other than tax exemption, but also because the 501(c)(3) category brings with it a
certain identity, both for the organization and in the public eye.
160
I.R.C. § 527(c).
161
This result could be accomplished administratively by, for example, striking the
regulatory declaration that political activity does not further social welfare purposes and
issuing other forms of guidance with respect to other noncharitable exemption categories,
such as 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6). As discussed in Part V infra, the result also could be
accomplished legislatively, which, all things equal, is preferable. Technically, a limit on
“unrelated” political activity would remain, and would help protect against capture concerns.
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purposes is subject to one important limitation, and, in any event, should
not be undertaken until the nontax advantages of noncharitable exempt
status (namely nondisclosure of donors) have been eliminated relative to the
political organization.
The important limitation relates to the tax treatment of political
activity. Under current law, if a noncharitable exempt slips into section 527
status, the tax treatment of political activity largely is unaffected. The
reason is that when Congress codified section 527, it created a norm for the
tax treatment of political activity, not just for political organizations, but
also across the exemption categories. Recall that the essential tax treatment
of a political organization is exemption for contribution income, but
taxation for investment (and other) income. The question of what to do
when a noncharitable exempt engages in political activity arose. There
could be unequal treatment as compared to a political organization to the
extent that (some of) the investment income of the noncharitable exempt is
not subject to tax.
162
Congress had the foresight to close the potential loophole,
and
provided that if a noncharitable exempt engages in political activity, a tax is
triggered on the lesser of the organization’s investment income or the
163
amount of its political expenditures.
The result was that political
operatives would not have a tax incentive to conduct political activity out of
164
a noncharitable exempt instead of a political organization.
Accordingly, from a tax perspective, it does not matter whether a
noncharitable exempt engages in political activity (so long as the political
165
activity is below the “primarily” threshold). Political activity generally is
166
taxed as it would be if it were conducted by a political organization.
Consistent treatment of political activity across the exemption categories is
the right result and one that must survive any relaxation of the political

162

The legislative history explained that noncharitable exempts should be treated “on
an equal basis for tax purposes with political organizations.” S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7505
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7505.
163
I.R.C. § 527(f).
164
In addition, Congress provided that the gift tax does not apply to contributions to
political organizations. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4).
165
As noted, if the political activity exceeds the primarily threshold, there is a tax
consequence with respect to the treatment of investment income, but not to the treatment of
the political activity income, which remains constant. See supra Part III(B)(3); infra Part
V(B)(3).
166
The Code allows a noncharitable exempt to avoid the tax by conducting its political
activity through a “separate segregated fund,” which is treated as a 527 organization. I.R.C.
§ 527(f)(3).
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167

activity limits on noncharitable exempts. Thus, assuming the vitality of
the tax on the political activity of noncharitable exempts, eliminating the
definitional political activity limitations has significant appeal. It would
simplify tax administration, improve compliance, and embrace free speech.
There remains, however, a critical nontax reason to retain political
activity limitations. As noted, political organizations, but not noncharitable
exempts, must disclose their donors to the public. If the blanket limitations
on political activity of noncharitable exempts were removed, erstwhile
political organizations likely would attempt to drop section 527 status in
favor of noncharitable exempt status and avoid the section 527 disclosure
168
regime.
From a tax perspective, choosing 501(c)(4) over 527 is not
169
especially problematic.
From a campaign finance perspective, it would
eviscerate donor disclosure rules.
In short, the ultimate usefulness of the political activity definitional
limitations on noncharitable exempts is not related to tax policy, but rather
is to distinguish between organizations that must disclose donors and
organizations that avoid disclosure. Were it not for this function, and from a
tax perspective, the rule that political activity does not further noncharitable
exempt purposes should be eliminated.
4.

Summary

Quantum-based solutions to the problem of political activity by
noncharitable exempts do not provide a clear advantage over present law.
Formally quantifying the “primarily” test would result in more certainty,
but would also require that the Service be more, not less, involved in
regulation of political activity. If the policy goal is to curb political activity,
changing the test from “primarily” to something more restrictive like
“substantially” or “exclusively” would be effective, but would create new
categories of taxable nonprofits that are treated worse than political
organizations for engaging in less political activity, creating an odd and
perhaps unconstitutional result. The problem of whether to quantify the test
or rely on facts and circumstances would remain.

167

As discussed in the next section, the Treasury could take immediate steps to improve
the vitality of this tax. See infra Part IV(B).
168
Intriguingly, whether this is possible depends upon whether section 527 treatment is
mandatory for organizations with a primary purpose of political activity, or optional. See
discussion infra Part V(B)(5).
169
The main tax issue would be that absent the gift tax on noncharitable exempts,
contributions of appreciated property would be income tax-favored relative to the political
organization. See supra Part III(B)(2). This preference should be eliminated. See discussion
infra Part V(B)(3).
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Further, it is not clear why it makes sense as a matter of tax exemption
to decree that political activity may not further noncharitable exempt
purposes. Political activity on its face often will be related to the primary
purpose of noncharitable exempt organizations. Before Citizens United, the
political activity limits were not especially relevant, but at least helped to
differentiate organization types. However, Citizens United largely rendered
existing tax law limitations obsolete by making a new kind of multi-purpose
organization possible. As a result, definitional political activity limits are no
longer justified and should be eliminated, but only if the 527(f) tax remains
vital and the differences in the disclosure regimes between political
organizations and noncharitable exempts are erased.
B. Other Administrative Approaches
Along with quantum-based solutions, other administrative approaches
include modifying the definition of political activity, promulgating
regulations under section 527, changing course on the gift tax, and a more
aggressive enforcement posture.
1.

Definitional Solutions

One of the principal solutions advanced by commentators and the
170
Service is focus on the definition of political activity.
The lack of
uniformity of a tax-law definition across the Code increases confusion for
taxpayers, policymakers, and for the Service. Further, the use of a facts and
circumstances test to define political activity also creates uncertainty,
making it difficult to comply with and enforce the law. Accordingly, the
Service and the Treasury Department could take steps to provide more
definitional uniformity and a brighter-line definition.
Recent proposed regulations on the political activity of 501(c)(4)
organizations move in the direction of bright lines. For example, the
proposed regulations state that voter registration and get-out-the-vote
efforts are political activity, as are certain advertisements that mention a
candidate by name within sixty days of a general election campaign (or
171
thirty days of a primary campaign).
As the Treasury Department
acknowledges in the preamble to the regulations, these bright-line rules lose
172
the nuance of a facts and circumstances approach,
which by its nature
170

See, e.g., GREG COLVIN ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT:
CLARIFYING IRS RULES ON POLITICAL INTERVENTION (interim draft) (May 8, 2014), available
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/May%208%20Explanation%20with%20Exhibit.pdf.
171
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,539 (Nov. 29, 2013).
172
Id. at 71,537.
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leaves open the question of whether activities are political. The gains of a
bright-line approach in terms of greater taxpayer certainty and even
enforcement may be offset by losses in accuracy and fairness, resulting in a
more restrictive approach overall. In addition, the proposed regulations
would frustrate a uniform definition by applying only to 501(c)(4)
173
organizations, leaving the law of political activity further fractured based
on the section and paragraph of the Code.
The proposed regulations thus illustrate the difficult balancing act
inherent in a bright-line solution. If the bright line positive definition is
over-inclusive, stakeholders will complain, nonpolitical activity will be
curtailed, and there will be additional opportunity for constitutional
challenges under the First Amendment. If the bright line is under-inclusive,
and a facts and circumstances test abandoned, then in some cases, the law
will be largely eviscerated.
Further, a bright line, whether under or over-inclusive, may not be so
bright, leading to ambiguity, loopholes, noncompliance, and uneven
enforcement. One irony is that present law, for all its faults, is a mixture of
both bright-line and facts and circumstances approaches. Over time,
consensus has formed on certain bright lines (through court decisions and
Service guidance), and facts and circumstances retained to account for lack
of consensus, factual nuance, and the changing nature of political
174
activity.
Some working definition of political activity is necessary for a variety
of reasons. On balance, a facts and circumstances approach, though
imprecise, best accounts for changes in behavior over time. That said, the
definitional problem is a difficult one, and in general it is beyond the scope
175
of this article to examine in depth the contours of the various definitions.
173

Id.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (providing twenty-one examples of
permitted and prohibited voter education activities, voter registration, candidate appearances,
issue advocacy, rental of facilities, provision of mailing lists, use of websites, and other
activities); Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73 (allowing a series of public forums if the forum
and content are neutral); Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178 (addressing factors that show
bias in the timing and distribution of voter guides); Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154
(providing guidance on the permitted content and structure of candidate questionnaires);
Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160 (allowing sponsoring of candidate debates and forums
that are educational and impartial); Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125 (providing that the
evaluation of the qualifications of candidates or support for a slate of candidates violates
section 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210 (allowing sponsoring of candidate
debates and forums that are educational and impartial).
175
See discussion of guidelines for defining political activity infra Part V(B)(5). For an
excellent overview and analysis of definitional issues, see ABA Tax Section Comments,
supra note 69.
174
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Nevertheless, in part because of the problems in defining political activity,
one goal should be to minimize the need for a definition by making it less
relevant for tax purposes. Reducing the relevance of political activity to the
tax system would not only help to reduce uncertainty, but also would reduce
the need for the Service to make difficult determinations that affect free
speech.
2.

Promulgate Regulations under 527(f)

One step the Treasury could take to maintain the integrity of existing
categories is to promulgate long “reserved” regulations under section 527.
The goal would be to eliminate any tax advantage to conducting political
activity using a noncharitable exempt instead of a 527.
As discussed above, the Code provides that the political activity of a
noncharitable exempt results in a tax on the organization’s investment
176
income.
However, the regulations have long “reserved” how to tax
certain political expenditures by noncharitable exempts, such as political
expenditures that are allowed under the Federal Election Campaign Act or
177
178
similar state statute, and “indirect” political expenditures.
The importance of both reserved regulations increased after the
Citizens United decision. Citizens United established a new category of
permitted expense, namely independent expenditures by corporations and
labor unions. The result is that as political activity migrates to noncharitable
exempts, until regulations are written, this new speech category, which
179
arguably is now allowed by the FECA,
may avoid triggering a tax on
investment income. Accordingly, pending regulations, there may be a tax
advantage to making independent expenditures and indirect political
expenditures from a noncharitable exempt rather than a political
176

If political expenditures are less than investment income, then the base for the tax is
political expenditures. As noted above, the reason for the tax is to create equal treatment for
political activity across code sections and incidentally to prevent political operatives from
avoiding taxation on investment income by moving political activity to noncharitable
exempts. In theory, the 527(f) tax should have a broader base — covering all nonexempt
function income (as defined by section 527). The limitation of the base to investment income
points to an acknowledgement that political organizations are not likely to have income other
than exempt function income and investment income.
177
Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(3) (1980).
178
Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(2) (1980). Indirect political expenditures include overhead
and other similar administrative type expenses.
179
For extensive discussion and recommendations on this issue, see Nancy E.
McGlamery & Rosemary E. Fei, Taxation with Reservations: Taxing Nonprofit Political
Expenditures After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 449, 449 (2011) (noting that “[a]fter
Citizens United, what is ‘allowable’ [under the FECA] has mushroomed”).
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180

organization. Treasury could eliminate this advantage with regulations or
other guidance.
Taking action on the reserved regulations would be an important and
fair administrative step, and would help to level the playing field across
exemption categories consistent with congressional intent.
3.

Reconsider Application of Gift Tax to Noncharitable Exempts

The gift tax is a crucial element in the taxation of political activity. In
general, gift tax applies to gifts by individuals above annual exemption
181
amounts. The Code provides an exception from the gift tax for transfers
182
to a political organization.
Donors to political organizations have no
concern about gift tax liability. However, there is no Code-based exception
for gifts to noncharitable exempts. Accordingly, donors considering
whether to fund political activity either by a political organization or by a
noncharitable exempt have a distinct tax reason to choose the political
organization to avoid gift tax liability.
After Citizens United, as more political activity shifted to the
noncharitable exempt, the Service faced pressure from Congress to stop
183
enforcing the gift tax. The Service ultimately yielded.
This abdication,
however, removed a principal tax disadvantage to using the noncharitable
exempt for political purposes. The result was to intensify the relevance of
the different disclosure regimes. In other words, once the Service gave way
on the gift tax issue, donors seeking anonymity would have every reason to
prefer funding political activity through a noncharitable exempt rather than
a political organization. Indeed, with the threat of the gift tax gone,
contributions of property to noncharitable exempts actually receive more
favorable tax treatment than property contributions to political
organizations because the donor avoids tax on any appreciation in the
184
property.
As a purely administrative matter, the Service could discourage
political organizations from abusing the noncharitable exempt form by
reconsidering its position on the gift tax. Enforcing the gift tax on donors to
noncharitable exempts that engage in political activity would force large

180

The tax advantage is potentially avoiding tax on investment income. Where an
organization has no investment income, however, there is no tax advantage.
181
I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(1), 2503(b). The gift tax does not apply to corporations.
182
I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4). The Code also provides an exception for transfers to a 501(c)(3)
organization. See I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (allowing a deduction).
183
See supra note 101.
184
I.R.C. § 84.
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donors to choose between gift tax liability and disclosure. Of course,
Congress would remain free to amend the Code to change this result.
Having already retreated on the gift tax issue, however, the
disadvantages of changing course are obvious. Arguably, Congress never
185
intended for the gift tax to apply to noncharitable exempt organizations.
Enforcing the gift tax also would raise questions of selective enforcement if
the Service ignored gifts to noncharitable exempts for nonpolitical
purposes. Thus, although the Service relinquished leverage by not enforcing
186
the gift tax, it would further strain the credibility of the agency now to
advance a position without political support based on a formal application
of the law.
4.

A More Aggressive Enforcement Posture

Another approach, though unlikely in the current political climate, is
for the Service to take a more aggressive enforcement posture in the area.
Arguably, one of the reasons the Service has been vulnerable to attack is
because it has been too timid over time. Timidity on issuing guidance, in
delaying resolution of cases, and on application of the gift tax all perhaps
led to the management fiasco, remarkable public apology, and ensuing
media circus.
The job of the Service is to administer the tax laws drafted by
Congress. The law requires the Service to sort exempt organizations into
categories based on political activity thresholds. Doing this job is difficult,
and will often encounter stiff political resistance. Further, because there is
little revenue to be gained by “targeting” an exempt organization, a tough
enforcement stance will not be an institutional priority.
Nevertheless, if the Service had been assertive in the wake of Citizens
United and reclassified some social welfare organizations as political
organizations, it might have established useful precedent and discouraged
others from attempting to exploit the ambiguity of the “primarily” test to
avoid disclosure. A more assertive Service also might force Congress to

185

See Polsky & Charles, supra note 24, at 1013 n.81 (noting that “[t]he application of
the gift tax to 501(c)(4) organizations is inappropriate in light of the intended purposes of the
gift tax . . . . [which] is to backstop the estate tax”). Polsky and Charles suggest one rationale
for imposing gift tax on 501(c)(4) organizations, namely to prevent contributions of
appreciated property, which if made to a political organization, would be subject to tax on
the appreciation. Id.
186
David van den Berg, Disappearing Social Welfare Groups Could Hinder IRS
Examinations, 2012 TNT 216-7 (November 7, 2012).
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legislate in the area,
which is where the solution to the problems of
political activity and exempt organizations can best be resolved.
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The key question in fashioning legislation is discerning the “mischief”
in need of a remedy or, put another way, agreeing on what needs fixing.
With so much sound and fury on the issue of political activity and taxexempt status, agreement on the mischief is elusive. The truth, though, is
188
simple. There is an underlying legal deficit that only Congress can fix.
A. Provide for Uniform Donor Disclosure Rules
An effective solution to the core problem raised by the political activity
189
of exempt organizations involves a legislative change
to the disclosure
rules. As outlined above, in the year 2000, Congress amended the tax code
to require political organizations publicly to disclose donor information in
order to close a campaign finance loophole. The Service was charged with
administering the disclosure regime and imposing tax penalties on failures
to disclose. This put the Service in the awkward position of a tax agency
playing at campaign law enforcement.
Perhaps more importantly, the 2000 changes also created a discrepancy
in the tax law. Donors must be disclosed if political activity is conducted by
a section 527 organization, but not if it is conducted by a noncharitable
exempt. The discrepancy created the incentive for political operatives to
engage in statutory arbitrage and is a direct cause of the problems the
Service faced after Citizens United.
The obvious solution is to provide for uniform rules on disclosure of
donors. If the disclosure rules were the same across the exemption
categories, there would be no reason to choose a tax category based on
disclosure. Uniform donor disclosure rules would immediately relieve
pressure on the “primarily” test (or other political activity limitations).
Political groups, without any disclosure benefits to organizing as a
noncharitable exempt, generally would prefer political organization status.
There would be no need to conjure or pay lip service to a social welfare or

187

The fact of proposed regulations on the political activity of social welfare
organizations are a welcome sign that the Service is taking action and involving the public
(and incidentally, the Congress) in the process of how to regulate in the area.
188
The Supreme Court also could reconsider Citizens United.
189
Although arguably disclosure could be achieved through administrative action, see
Tobin, supra note 103, at 440, legislation is preferable after the recent scandals. See Tobin,
Where Do We Go From Here, supra note 39.
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other noncharitable exempt purpose. The noncharitable exempt category
would recede out of the limelight once again to occupy its historical place
as relatively inconsequential. Indeed, whether or not disclosure is required
is less important for tax purposes than that there be uniformity — so the
same type of activity is disclosed (or not) regardless of tax classification.
From a tax perspective, the ideal would be to eliminate disclosure rules
from section 527 and leave disclosure to be addressed by the campaign
190
finance law and the FEC.
As recent events have shown, monitoring
campaign speech is a damaging distraction for an agency that should have
191
tax collection (not campaign finance) as its priority.
New disclosure
obligations by noncharitable exempts imposed via the tax law would more
192
deeply involve the Service in enforcing campaign finance law and should
193
be avoided.
Regardless of whether the instrument of disclosure is tax or campaign
finance law, a difficult issue in establishing a disclosure regime for
noncharitable exempts is deciding how much to preserve the privacy of
194
donors that make contributions to fund nonpolitical activities. A simple
approach would be to require the disclosure of all donors if a noncharitable

190

Accord Tobin, supra note 103, at 1129 (concluding that Congress should “pass
broad-based legislation requiring disclosure of campaign-related activity and remove the
Service as a campaign finance regulatory agency”). The DISCLOSE Act, introduced in
Congress after Citizens United, is an example of such an approach. H.R. 148, 113th Cong.
(2013). It amends the Federal Election Campaign Act, not the Internal Revenue Code, to
require disclosure of independent expenditures. The DISCLOSE Act, however, shows a
limited vision in limiting the disclosure requirement generally to nonprofit organizations and
political committees. Disclosure should be based on the type of activity, not the type of
entity, and in that way would also cover activity by for-profit or taxable nonprofit
organizations.
191
As discussed above, the Treasury indirectly could reach this result by eliminating
political activity limits on noncharitable exempt organizations, assuming that political
activity status is voluntary. A legislative change clearly would be preferable. Professor Ellen
Aprill has argued that one reason Congress used the tax code for campaign finance
disclosure was to protect the disclosure requirements from constitutional challenge, i.e., by
making disclosure a constitutional condition of a tax “subsidy.” She notes, however, that
after Citizens United upheld disclosure provisions under campaign finance law, reliance on
the taxing power may no longer be required. Aprill, supra note 34, at 400; see also Polsky &
Charles, supra note 24, at 1022–24.
192
Any new disclosure rules likely would require complex anti-abuse rules, only further
involving the Service in nontax matters.
193
See Mayer, supra note 85, at 682 (arguing that the FEC and not the Service should
be the institution of choice for monitoring disclosure).
194
This issue is not present when requiring disclosure of contributors to political
organizations, which generally do not engage in nonpolitical activity.
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195

exempt engages in any (or a set amount of)
political activity. This,
however, would result in over-disclosure and compromise the privacy of
donors that fund nonpolitical activity. On the other hand, such a bright line
would be easy to administer and understand. It would also likely have the
result of encouraging noncharitable exempts to conduct any political
activity from a separate segregated fund that was funded solely by outside
contributions. By segregating the funding of political activity, the
organization could protect against over-disclosure. Noncharitable exempts
that did not so conduct their political activity would likely face the wrath of
donors. Another option would be disclosure of all donors making
contributions above a certain threshold amount, e.g., $25,000.
Apart from the merits of any particular disclosure regime, the critical
point is uniformity. Without uniform donor disclosure rules, there will
remain reasons apart from taxation to choose one tax classification over
another. It is this disparity more than any other that is the cause of current
problems.
B. Legislative Solutions Grounded in Tax Policy
Although uniform donor disclosure rules are essential, ideally there are
steps Congress should take from a tax perspective to improve the rules that
govern political activity and tax exemption. The key is to recognize that
Citizens United changed the legal landscape and that current tax law rules
are outmoded.
1.

Eliminate Limits on the Political Activity of Noncharitable Exempts

As discussed in depth in Part IV(A)(3) above, prior to Citizens United,
the political activity limitations were a helpful device to sort exempt
organizations. Now that campaign finance law allows unlimited
independent expenditures, there is no continuing tax law justification to the
artificial and unrealistic definitional political activity limits on
noncharitable exempts or, relatedly, to the loss of exemption of nonpolitical
activity income for exceeding political activity limits. Accordingly,

195

Requiring disclosure only by organizations that engage in political activity above
some threshold amount would help to minimize overdisclosure. Although insubstantial
amounts of political activity would go undisclosed, the privacy of donors to noncharitable
exempts with minimal political activity would be protected. Although requiring a dollar or
other threshold entails legal and administrative costs, if the job of enforcement is left to the
FEC and not the Service, the concerns are diminished. See generally Tobin, supra note 103
(suggesting a threshold of $25,000).

50

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 34:1

Congress should affirmatively recognize that political activity is not by
196
definition an unrelated activity for a noncharitable exempt organization.
2.

Expand Exempt Status of Political Organizations

Another approach would be for Congress to expand the tax exemption
for political organizations to include income from a noncharitable exempt
purpose (in particular, for social welfare, labor, and trade association
purposes). This would have the effect of eliminating the sanction for breach
of the political activity limits by a noncharitable exempt.
Thus, assuming the political activity limits are retained, if a
noncharitable exempt violated the limits and had a primary purpose of
political activity, it would become a political organization as under current
law. But unlike current law, the underlying tax treatment of the organization
197
would not change significantly.
Noncharitable exempt purpose income
would remain exempt. Political activity income would largely be
unaffected. The 527(f) tax would be replaced in effect with a tax on
investment income. The Service would still have to determine whether an
organization’s primary purpose was political or not, but different tax
treatment would not be a principal consequence of reclassification. In other
words, to the extent that the labeling function of the present law categories
is useful, expansion of the 527 exemption would maintain present law
198
labels, but just erase the significant tax law differences.

196

To the extent applicable, other doctrines would help to protect against abuse of
power by organization managers. The private benefit doctrine for example could be applied
to organizations captured by political interests. See, e.g., I.R.S., 1981 EO CPE TEXT, supra
note 152.
197
The different tax treatment of donors would remain.
198
For reasons unrelated to political activity, Congress also should consider imposing
tax on the investment income of noncharitable exempts. As others have shown, the
exemption from tax on investment income for noncharitable exempts is a subsidy without
significant justification. See Halperin, supra note 12. If the subsidy were eliminated, then the
baseline tax treatment between the noncharitable exempt and the political organization
would be broadly similar and normatively correct. A spillover benefit would be to reduce
even further the significance of political activity to taxation, as the need for the Service to
track the political activity of noncharitable exempts for purposes of protecting the tax base
on investment income would disappear. In other words, the 527(f) tax would become
redundant.
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Extend Income Taxation to Transfers of Appreciated Property When
Made to Noncharitable Exempts

As noted, under current law, donors of appreciated property to a
199
political organization must pay income tax on the appreciation.
By
contrast, donations of appreciated property to a noncharitable exempt do not
result in income tax. Because the Service will not enforce the gift tax on
200
donations to noncharitable exempts,
the result is that political donors
with appreciated property to contribute will prefer giving to a noncharitable
201
exempt instead of a political organization in order to avoid income tax.
As with disclosure rules, this inconsistency was of little moment before
Citizens United. Now that noncharitable exempts may engage in unlimited
independent political activity, the income tax differential matters as it
creates an additional reason to conduct political activity using the
noncharitable exempt form.
The potential for tax avoidance is straightforward. A donor with highly
appreciated stock donates to a noncharitable exempt in Year 1. Assuming
the donation is a gift, no income tax applies on the unrealized appreciation
202
at the time of the donation.
Also in Year 1, the noncharitable exempt
sells the stock, and does not pay income tax on the proceeds because of
income tax exemption. The noncharitable exempt refrains from political
activity in Year 1 in order to avoid imposition of the 527(f) tax on
investment income. In Year 2, however, the noncharitable exempt uses the
proceeds from the stock sale to fund political activity. Because there is no
investment income in Year 2, no 527(f) tax is owed. In this way,
appreciated stock may be contributed without triggering income tax on the
appreciation either to the donor or to the organization.
Congress imposed the tax on donations of appreciated property to
political organizations in order to “prevent[] avoidance of tax by individuals
by taxing them on any unrealized appreciation attributable to their
203
contributions.”
Absent a tax on the donor, the political organization
would bear the tax burden upon sale and realization of investment income.
199

I.R.C. § 84.
See supra note 101.
201
If the Service had maintained the threat of enforcement of the gift tax on gifts to
noncharitable exempts, the nontaxation of appreciated property gifts under the income tax
generally would not have been a sufficient reason to contribute. That is, donors of property
with a choice between paying gift tax on the entire amount of the contribution (if made to a
noncharitable exempt) or income tax on the amount of appreciation (if made to a political
organization) would opt for the income tax and donate to a political organization.
202
I.R.C. § 102.
203
S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7481 (1975).
200
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204

Thus, the concern at the time was over whether the donor or the political
organization should bear the tax burden, and not that the unrealized
appreciation would go untaxed. The issue today is of greater concern
because tax on appreciation may be avoided entirely. This runs contrary to
the congressional policy of taxing investment income with respect to
political activity, and with the view that transfers of appreciated property
205
for political purposes are not gifts and therefore gain should be realized
upon transfer.
The solution is to extend the income tax on unrealized appreciation to
206
donors making contributions to noncharitable exempts. The tax could be
limited only to noncharitable exempts that engage in political activity
(within several years of the gift). Broader reform, however, would extend
the tax to all contributions of appreciated property to noncharitable
exempts. The reasoning would be that such contributions are not gifts (for
income or gift tax purposes) and thus the transfer should be a realization
event.
4.

Defining Political Activity

Another question is whether Congress should take action on the
definition of political activity. A benefit of eliminating definitional political
activity limits is that political activity becomes less important. Tax
exemption for noncharitable exempts would no longer turn on political
activity thresholds. However, political activity would remain significant for
purposes of disclosure, imposition of the 527(f) tax, maintaining the line
between the 501(c)(3) organization and other exempts, denial of business
deductions, and depending upon the statutory architecture, sorting
organizations into categorical distinctions.
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in depth what should
and should not be included in a political activity definition, but some broad
objectives can be sketched. The definition of political activity for purposes
of disclosure should generally follow campaign finance law. This is because
the reasons to disclose information about political activity are rooted in

204

Prior to Congress’s enactment of section 84, the IRS determined that the political
organization should pay tax on the gain.
205
By making the “transfer” of appreciated property to a political organization a
realization event, Congress stated its belief that transfers of property for political purposes
were not gifts, and therefore that the transfer was a realization event. Id. (stating that
“campaign contributions in reality are not a gift, but rather constitute contributions to further
the general political or good-government objectives of the donor”).
206
See Polsky & Charles, supra note 24, at n.81 (encouraging realization for
appreciated property gifts to noncharitable exempts in the absence of gift tax).
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207

campaign finance law, not tax law.
Reliance on campaign finance
definitions will help to ensure that, to the extent lawmakers continue to ask
the Service to enforce campaign finance law, at least the Service will not be
charged with defining the substance of what must be disclosed. In addition,
the campaign finance definition of political activity also could be used to
monitor the boundary between the noncharitable exempt and the political
organization. Assuming that this boundary is retained and that the main tax
differences between the two categories are eliminated, there would be little
reason to utilize a tax law definition solely for the purpose of sorting
organizations into categories.
Nevertheless, a distinct tax law definition of political activity remains
useful to protect the tax base. The Code requires that political activity be
funded with after-tax dollars, i.e., no deduction is allowed for political
activity. This rule surfaces in two contexts: the political activities
208
prohibition on charities,
and the denial of a business deduction for
209
political activity contributions, e.g., directly to a candidate or indirectly
to a noncharitable exempt or political organization.
Accordingly, there is a tax law reason to define political activity
independently from campaign finance law. A narrow tax law definition
means more activity will be deductible (either as a business expense or as a
charitable contribution). A broader definition (and so fewer deductions)
protects the tax base, and insofar as political activity is a form of
consumption, is consistent with general tax principles, at least in the
210
individual context.
Present law boundaries, even though nonuniform and policed in large
part by a facts and circumstances test, can be defended on the ground that
the Treasury Department is better protected by a definition that may be
211
overinclusive rather than underinclusive.
Especially in the context of
charitable contributions, a tax law definition that is distinct from (and
broader than) a campaign finance definition is helpful to protect against
212
dilution of charitable purposes.
Although uniformity is a useful goal,
uniformity nonetheless sometimes must yield to other tax policy objectives.
207

In general, the reasons are to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 at 314 (2010). The Supreme Court consistently
has upheld the constitutionality of disclosure rules. Id.
208
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).
209
I.R.C. § 162(e).
210
I.R.C. § 262.
211
See also Polsky, supra note 10 (discussing the reasons for a broad definition of
political activity for tax purposes).
212
Accord Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,537 (Nov. 29,
2013) (noting that in the charitable context “a more nuanced consideration of the totality of
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Clarify Whether Section 527 is Mandatory and Develop an Alternate
Political Activity Baseline

Under current law, it is not clear whether section 527 treatment is
mandatory or voluntary. The uncertainty results from the year 2000
amendments to section 527.
Before the amendments, political organization treatment was
213
mandatory.
Mandatory treatment was generally appropriate because, as
discussed in Part II, the political activity baseline established by section 527
generally makes sense as the normative (i.e., nonsubsidy) treatment. In
other words, section 527 was mandatory in the same sense as “regular” tax
treatment is mandatory for a corporation formed for profit —it is simply the
default.
In the year 2000, Congress required political organizations to file a
214
notice of existence with the Service. Although Congress did not change
215
the “mandatory” language of the Code, Congress required that the notice
216
must be filed in order to be “described in the section.” The inference is
that failure to file the notice means the organization is not “described in the
section” and so is not a political organization. Congress also imposed
significant disclosure burdens enforced by stiff penalties on section 527
organizations, thus mandating a cost to being described as a political
217
organization.
The combination of unclear statutory language and the
imposition of burdens on political organization status thus raised the
question of whether political organizations could elect out of section 527
treatment.
The significance of whether section 527 is mandatory or voluntary is
varied and important. For example, if the 2000 changes made 527 a
voluntary section, political organizations may opt out of disclosure rules
that are tied to the tax status. Further, if the definitional limits on political
activity were to be eliminated, without uniform donor disclosure rules,

facts and circumstances may be appropriate”).
213
“A political organization shall be subject to taxation under this subtitle only to the
extent provided in this section.” I.R.C. § 527(a).
214
I.R.C. § 527(i).
215
Section 527(a) was not amended.
216
“[A]n organization shall not be treated as an organization described in this
section . . . unless it has given notice . . . that it is to be so treated.” I.R.C § 527(i)(1).
217
I.R.C. § 527(j). For a more complete discussion of the voluntary-mandatory
question, see Aprill, supra note 34 (discussing the issues); Colinvaux supra note 19
(concluding that the section is voluntary); Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on
Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773 (2007) (concluding that the section is
not technically elective); Tobin, supra note 103 (concluding that the section is mandatory).
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organizations could choose between political organization and
noncharitable exempt status on the basis of disclosure rules, making
nonsense of the political organization category.
If tax treatment as a political organization is mandatory, however,
elimination of the definitional political activity limits, though seemingly a
radical change, would not in effect be much different from current law. For
example, under current law, if a noncharitable exempt engages in
significant amounts of political activity, the “primary purpose” of the
organization at some point becomes political. Political organization
218
treatment follows a primary purpose test. Thus, if political organization
treatment is mandatory, eliminating definitional limits on the political
activity of noncharitable exempts would do little to change the legal
architecture. The Service still would have to enforce the line between
noncharitable exempt and political organization status based on a
219
“primarily” test, albeit a different one.
More fundamentally though, the mandatory-voluntary question
implicates the right of an organization to be taxed on its net income and
highlights the need for an alternative tax baseline for political organizations
outside of section 527. Assuming section 527 remained mandatory, the year
2000 changes introduced alternate tax regimes for political organizations
within section 527, which hinge on whether the notice of existence is filed.
If the notice is filed, then the political activity baseline applies. If the notice
is not filed, the result is to “tak[e] into account” political activity income
and the “deductions directly connected with the production of such
220
income.” The normal implication would be that political expenses would
offset the presumably taxable political contributions, resulting in a tax on
net income.
A separate provision of the Code, however, generally provides that no
221
deduction is allowed for political activity expenses. Thus, if section 527
is mandatory and political activity income is not exempt, then the penalty
for failure to file a notice in effect is taxation on the organization’s gross
income — a highly punitive result — just for forming as a political
organization.
218

I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (defining a political organization as one “organized and operated
primarily for the purpose of [political activity]”).
219
As a practical matter, however, it might be even harder than presently to push an
organization into section 527 status, giving rise (absent uniform donor disclosure rules) to
increased nondisclosure relative to current law.
220
I.R.C. § 527(i)(4). One district court concluded that by this paragraph Congress
“expressly” subjected political contributions to income tax. National Federation of
Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1316 n.20 (S.D. Ala 2002).
221
I.R.C. §§ 162(e), 262.
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Punitive tax treatment of political organizations has been justified in
large part from the belief discussed in Part II that the political activity
baseline provides a subsidy. If so, then the argument is that the notice and
disclosure conditions may constitutionally be imposed as a condition of the
222
subsidy. The absence of a subsidy, however, directly calls into question
223
the rationale of a constitutional condition.
Unless there is a viable
alternative tax status available, i.e., unless section 527 is voluntary and
there is a reasonable default tax treatment, the notice and disclosure
provisions are a perhaps unconstitutional condition on formation as a
political organization. Further, even if one accepts the subsidy conclusion, a
“mandatory” subsidy under penalty of draconian tax treatment is
exceptionally harsh, giving additional weight to an interpretation of section
224
527 as a voluntary section.
A separate problem, however, is that even if section 527 is construed
225
properly as voluntary, there is no clear nonpunitive tax status available
for a political organization. One choice is for organizations opting out of the
political organization regime to rely on pre-section 527 authority for
exemption for political activity income. Although revival of the
administrative exemption might seem a slender reed on which to base
226
taxation, to the extent deductions for political activity expenses are not
allowed, the alternative is to be taxed on gross income.
222

As others have documented, Congress used the tax code and not campaign finance
law to pass the notice and disclosure rules to protect the provisions from a constitutional
attack. The theory was that these provisions were constitutional conditions of a subsidy, per
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash. See Aprill, supra note 34.
223
As Professor Aprill has said, however, if the exemption label is a subsidy for
constitutional law purposes, then the absence of a subsidy for theoretical tax purposes is of
no moment. See Aprill, supra note 34.
224
One way out is to conclude that Congress did not intend to tax political
organizations that did not file a notice with the Service on their gross income, but rather
assumed that organizations not filing the notice would continue to receive an administrativebased exemption on political activity income.
225
As discussed in Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 542: “[I]f in 2000 Congress had
introduced a disclosure regime and retained the mandatory aspect of section 527, political
organizations would, as a general matter, have been treated worse than other organizations
with a Code-based exemption. In general, other exempt organizations elect into a Code
section by holding themselves out as meeting the requirements of the Code, and then filing
the applicable information return. But if an organization decides not to rely on an exemption
provision, it can always file a tax return. Indeed, the notion that an exempt organization can
have its exempt status revoked rests on the fundamental concept that exempt status is
voluntary and elective.”
226
Political activity income also could be exempt as capital contributions, or perhaps as
gifts. See Barbara K. Rhomberg, Constitutional Issues Cloud the Gift Taxation of Section
501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 164 (2004); supra note 44; Barbara K.
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The concern is all the more pressing in the wake of Citizens United.
The effect of denying a deduction for political activity expenses before
Citizens United (either within or without section 527) was tempered by
campaign finance law prohibitions on corporate political activity. After
Citizens United, corporations have more speech choices. Because there is
ambiguity as to whether section 527 is mandatory, corporations will seek
alternative tax statuses, either as noncharitable exempts, taxable nonprofits,
or for-profit organizations. The new opportunities for corporate speech will
place additional pressure both on an interpretation of section 527 that makes
it a mandatory tax on gross income if no notice is filed, and on the
appropriate taxation of political activity outside of the section 527
framework. Accordingly, it is time to consider an appropriate political
activity baseline outside of 527 that would allow the deduction of political
227
activity expenses.
In this context, the parallels between section 527 and the exemption
provided for homeowners associations under section 528 are illuminating.
228
Section 528 was enacted the year after section 527. The issues presented
were very similar. Homeowners associations pool the income of their
members to maintain common property. Before section 528, there were
questions about the extent to which income from members was taxed to the
association, especially amounts collected but not spent in the year
229
collected. Applying a pooling of income theory, Congress answered that
such amounts were not income, providing in section 528 that the “exempt
function income” of a homeowners association (dues and other payments
230
for purposes of the association) was exempt. But all other income of a
homeowners association was subject to tax.
Conceptually, political organizations and homeowners associations are
similar, and so is the exemption Congress provided. One notable difference,
however, is that homeowner association treatment is elective on a taxable
231
year basis.
A homeowners association calculates whether it would be

Rhomberg, The Law Remains Unsettled on Gift Taxation of Section 501(c)(4) Contributions,
15 TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 62 (2003).
227
Highlighted again is the importance of removing campaign finance-based conditions
from the Code. Without such conditions, political organization treatment sensibly could be
mandatory. Then, to the extent for-profit political organizations form and a subsidy is
provided, Congress could develop an appropriate alternative baseline for a for-profit political
organization.
228
See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
229
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 598–99 (Comm. Print 1976).
230
Id. at 599–600.
231
Treas. Reg. § 1.528-8 (1980).
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better off being taxed as a C corporation (with a deduction for homeowner
association expenses allowed) or as a section 528. Campaign finance
limitations on corporate political activity made this type of an election for a
political organization unnecessary in 1975. But something similar now is
needed after Citizens United.
6.

Protect the Charitable Deduction

There is a remaining critical issue that must be addressed post-Citizens
United, even if nothing else is done. Because more noncharitable exempts
now will engage in political activity, there is a serious risk that the
charitable organization will be used as a flow through for political funds.
The pathway is simple. A donor makes a contribution to a charity, takes a
charitable contribution deduction, then the charity makes a grant to a
politically active noncharitable exempt. Voilà, nondeductible political
232
activity becomes deductible.
The laundering of political expenses
through charitable organizations is of major concern to the integrity of the
charitable deduction, charitable exempt purposes, and the tax base.
Before Citizens United, the problem existed but arguably was
manageable without a legislative solution. Charities commonly create
associated 501(c)(4) organizations to engage in lobbying activity (and
perhaps occasional political activity). Thus, deductible 501(c)(3) dollars in
theory could be used to fund nondeductible lobbying or political activity by
grant from 501(c)(3) to 501(c)(4). To protect against this abuse, welladvised organizations develop clear firewalls and policies to ensure that the
233
501(c)(3) money is used appropriately.
Further, the fact of campaign
finance limits on the political activity by noncharitable exempts meant that
the temptation to launder money through a charity (at great risk to the
charity), though present, likely was modest.
After Citizens United, however, the opportunities to abuse the
501(c)(3) form have magnified. The increase of political activity by
noncharitable exempts is inherent to the Citizens United decision, and will
lead to a proliferation of exempt organization networks, often with a charity
at the helm. Money will flow from 501(c)(3) to noncharitable exempts in
increasing quantities. Inevitably, some charities will even be set up as
shams to launder (i.e., to make deductible) independent expenditures.

232

Admittedly, this problem could be worse if political activity limits are eliminated for
noncharitable exempts. But it is a real concern under current law, which generally allows
nearly half of a noncharitable exempt’s activity to be political.
233
Private foundations are extra-cautious in this area. If a private foundation makes a
grant for a noncharitable purpose it is subject to an excise tax. I.R.C. § 4945.
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This type of problem is not new but has existed for some time in other,
related areas. For example, in the context of the business deduction, the
issue arises when a business pays dues to a noncharitable exempt that
engages in nondeductible lobbying or political activity. Business member
234
dues are deductible business expenses.
The concern is that deductible
member dues could be used for nondeductible political or lobbying activity.
Congress sensibly responded to this concern by requiring the noncharitable
exempt either to pay a tax on the political or lobbying activity or notify the
235
payor that an allocable portion of the member dues were not deductible.
This mechanism often is referred to as a “proxy tax,” i.e., the tax on the
noncharitable exempt is a proxy for denying the deduction to the donor.
Congress also anticipated a similar money laundering problem in the
private foundation context. A private foundation is a kind of 501(c)(3)
236
organization that is typically funded by a wealthy patron. The continued
influence of the patron over the private foundation led Congress to adopt a
237
series of anti-abuse rules.
One rule imposes an excise tax on private
foundation grants that are not for a charitable (or other 501(c)(3)) purpose,
238
technically called a “taxable expenditure.” The tax is payable by both the
239
foundation and foundation managers.
A taxable expenditure includes a private foundation grant that is used
240
for political activity.
In some cases, private foundations are able to
protect themselves from imposition of the excise tax by exercising
“expenditure responsibility,” i.e., extensive tracking and reporting, with
241
respect to grants made to noncharitable exempts (or individuals). Fear of
the excise tax has led private foundations to exercise great caution with how
242
charitable funds are spent. Thus, foundations already are faced with tax
234
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98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 547.
236
I.R.C. § 509.
237
Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundations Law: Historical Perspectives on
Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000).
238
I.R.C. § 4945(d).
239
I.R.C. § 4945(a).
240
I.R.C. § 4945(d)(2).
241
See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4).
242
See Letter from Gary D. Bass, Exec. Director, The Bauman Foundation to Amy F.
Giuliano, Office of the Associate Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 19, 2013),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=IRS-2013-0038-0082
(explaining that a disparity in the definition of “political activities” for 501(c)(3) and
501(c)(4) organizations “will only increase anxiety among many charity executives and
private foundations already nervous about nonpartisan civic engagement because of the
235

60

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 34:1

consequences if, for example, grants to a noncharitable exempt are used for
political activity.
Similar legislative solutions now must be considered to protect against
abuse of the charitable deduction in the advent of Citizens United. Congress
could adopt a proxy tax on the 501(c)(3) organization that would apply to
the extent of grants to a noncharitable exempt that engages in political
activity. A proxy tax would not prevent or inhibit the establishment of
exempt organization networks, but would help to ensure that funding for
noncharitable exempts that are affiliated with a 501(c)(3) occurs with
nondeductible dollars.
In the alternative, Congress could extend the taxable expenditure
concept to cover 501(c)(3) grants to noncharitable exempts that engage in
political activity. Thus, all 501(c)(3)s, and not just private foundations,
would have to exercise expenditure responsibility, but only on grants where
there is a prima facie risk of use for political activity.
7.

Other Approaches
243

There are other possible legislative approaches.
Legislation could
abolish categories of exemption such as the social welfare category. Or
legislation could alter the standard for exemption by articulating new
thresholds for political activity by noncharitable exempts. For example, “no
substantial part” of a noncharitable exempt’s activities could be political.
Legislation could also then define “substantial” with percentages and
definitions. The objections to such legislative approaches are similar to the
objections raised if the Service were to attempt them. They ignore the core
problem of statutory arbitrage, continue the present law fallacy of declaring
political activity as inconsistent by definition with noncharitable exempt
status, and more deeply involve the Service in regulating political activity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Contributions to fund political activity in an organizational form have
from the inception of the income tax always been exempt. Exemption,
though, was not to subsidize the activity but to avoid taxing the activity
twice. Before Citizens United, the significance of political activity to the tax
exemption system was mostly as a sorting device — a way to label

ambiguity of current IRS rules”).
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For a discussion of approaches based on increasing the transparency of the Service’s
administrative process, see George K. Yin, Saving the IRS, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 22
(2014).
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organizations as either primarily political, or not. As a matter of taxation,
244
political activity was not especially important.
By permitting a new category of speech, Citizens United made the taxexemption system obsolete when it comes to political activity. After
Citizens United, it no longer makes sense to view organizations in black and
white terms. The fact is that noncharitable exempt organizations will
engage in increasing quantities of political activity. There is no reason for
the tax system to impose arbitrary limits. Further, what were marginal
inconsistencies in legal treatment across exemption categories with respect
to political activity are now magnified.
Accordingly, this article argues for a number of changes. Most
important, Congress should enact uniform donor disclosure rules for
political activity, and preferably leave enforcement to the FEC. Assuming
as a result that no tax differences remain that hinge on donor disclosure,
Congress then should eliminate the regulatory stipulation that political
activity does not further noncharitable exempt purposes, making political
activity largely irrelevant to tax classification (apart from 501(c)(3)
organizations). In addition, Congress should affirm that the gift tax does not
apply with respect to political contributions, but also extend the income tax
to transfers of appreciated property to noncharitable exempts. Taken
together, these changes do not eliminate the need to define political activity,
but reduce its importance. Where the definition of political activity
continues to matter for tax purposes (and so a campaign finance definition
is less appropriate), a facts and circumstances-based definition generally is
preferable to a bright line. Further, Congress should acknowledge that the
increase in political speech by noncharitable exempts will lead to abuse of
charitable organizations, and take steps to prevent the laundering of
independent expenditures through the charitable form. Congress also should
recognize that Citizens United has led to a need to develop a new baseline
for political activity conducted “for profit” or outside of section 527.
The problem of political activity and tax exemption is like a Gordian’s
knot, a seemingly unsolvable and intractable problem. Although the knot
contains many strands, Congress can untie it with a simple legislative stroke
to unify donor disclosure rules. Exempt organizations, apart from charities,
then should be left free to engage in political activity in order to accomplish
their exempt purposes.
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The exception is for the charitable organization. Even here, in theory, tax exemption
should not be affected by engaging in political activity. A charitable organization could
simply reorganize under section 501(c)(4) — maintaining exempt status, but losing the other
tax benefits associated with charitable status. Section 504 prevents this result, however. See
I.R.C. § 504.

